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CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Writer Calls for Arab Withdrawal From Atomic Energy Agency
 (Ahmad Baha'al-Din; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 20 Jun 81) 1

EGYPT

Current University Issues Reviewed
 (Labib al-Siba'i; AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, 6 Jul 81) 7

Benefits, Favorable Points of High Dam Reviewed
 (Usamah Mihran; AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, 6 Jul 81) 10

Expert Offers Independent Judgment on High Dam Controversy
 (Muhammad Nu'man; AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, 6 Jul 81) 17

IRAN

Background of 'Bloodbath' Studied
 (VIEWPOINT, 9 Jul 81) 21

Government Grants Subsidy to Inventors
 (ETTELA'AT, 28 Jul 81) 23

Background of Newspaper Closures Reviewed
 (Phil Davison; 8 DAYS, 25 Jul 81) 24

Ministry Announces Unemployment Compensation Plan
 (KEYHAN, 16 Jul 81) 26

Radio-Moscow Broadcasts Criticized by Spokesman Nabavi
 (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 21 Jul 81) 30

Students Conduct Political Agitation in India
 (Sumanta Banerjee; 8 DAYS, 25 Jul 81) 35

ISRAEL

Jerusalem Educational System Seeks Ethnic Integration (Yitzhak Shor; AL HAMISHMAR, 1 Jan 81)	37
New Industrial Materials Developed (Mordkhay Artzieli; HA'ARETZ, 20 May 81)	40
Military Industry Displays New Weapons (Tzvi Harel; HA'ARETZ, 8 May 81)	41
Briefs	
New Sniper Telescope	44

LEBANON

Jumayyil's Contacts With Followup Committee Detailed (Ghassan Bayram; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 20 Jun 81)	45
---	----

MOROCCO

Report on Domestic Issues, Western Sahara Referendum (8 DAYS, 25 Jul 81)	48
Immediate Action Urged, Editorial 'Controlled Referendum', by Stephen Hughes, Tim McGirk	
Briefs	
Administrative Reorganization of Casablanca	55
Appointment of Prefects	55

SUDAN

Potential of New Antigovernment Alliance Reviewed (Muhammad al-Hasan Khalil; AL-DUSTUR, various dates)	56
---	----

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

WRITER CALLS FOR ARAB WITHDRAWAL FROM ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 60, 20 Jun 81 pp 16-17

Article by Ahmad Baha' al-Din: "Why Don't All Arabs Withdraw From Atomic Energy Agency?"

Text I truly pity the Arab ministers of foreign affairs, especially the veterans among them.

They live aboard planes more than they live in their homes and stand on rostrums more than they sit behind their desks. At times, one imagines that the Arab ministers of foreign affairs are the only fighters in the Arab world or that we have come to believe that the division of Arab ministers of foreign affairs eliminates the need for 100 armored divisions.

What is more, they have carried year after year the futility of all the disputes that have erupted between their governments and their leaders.

What is the end of these meetings, resolutions and calls?

What is the end of these resolutions that we have gotten the UN, the Islamic countries, the nonaligned countries and even Europe and America to issue?

I don't think there is a cause in the world that has gotten such a number of unimplemented resolutions and of resolutions to fly the Palestinian flag in dozens of world capitals without flying it over a single inch of Palestine's soil?

What Then?

I know an Arab minister of foreign affairs who almost lost his position years after the 1967 war because he told the head of his state: "We have done all that diplomacy can realize and we have had all kinds of possible and impossible resolutions issued. Now, it is either the force which both the enemy and the friend take into account or else there is no meaning in persisting in a toothless diplomacy and in an acknowledged right that has no talons."

By this I am not calling for sounding the bugle for general attack against the enemy tomorrow. Moreover, I am not calling for abandoning the political struggle in all spheres.

But there has to be a strategy which encompasses both war and peace and contains both the sword of al-Mu'izz and his black gold.

We use the word "strategy" in place and out of place because everything turns into a word with us.

But in the political dictionary, there is a word above the word strategy, namely the supreme strategy.

What exactly is this supreme strategy to us so that each action may complement it and may be in harmony with it?

What do we want in the long run and what do we want in the short run, with the ability to realize what we want?

Peace with conditions? Use of the peace weapon with utter seriousness?

War, whatever its date? Then, we want to see our societies prepare seriously for this likelihood.

Is it to contain Israel with something like a new long truce until the balances of power change?

These are the supreme strategic decisions that require courage and strength, that require us to "work for this world as if we are going to live forever and to work for the hereafter as if we are going to die tomorrow" and that require us not to be content with one half the venerable Hadith without the other half.

As for dancing on stairs, it can only lead to catastrophe.

Even if our negative option is the state of no peace, no war, which is the existing state, then it also requires a study, a plan translated into specific positions and into certain options, all of which are directed to serve this position /presumably meaning option/ and to develop it with the change of circumstances.

But the presence of the state of no peace, no war just because this is what actually exists and because we cannot or do not want to change this state is something that allows Israel to take advantage of the benefits of both war and peace simultaneously.

Most of the Arab countries are, legally and officially, in a state of war with Israel. Consequently, they should expect military operations by the enemy whenever he gets the opportunity or finds the right atmosphere, regardless of whether he is treacherous or not, because this is war.

The greatest cause for surprise is the surprise over the Arab surprise generated by the Israeli raid against the nuclear reactor in Baghdad.

I don't know how long we will continue to have a totally unjustifiable surprise every season or how long we will continue to call for war every day, and then when a military action occurs we will continue to go screaming to the world and asking others to inflict the punishment for us!

All that can be said in writing, in speeches and in analysis about the Israeli raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor has been said.

But there remain, in my estimate, several points that need to be emphasized because they may be the most important conclusions:

The first point: It has been expressed well by James Reston, a well-informed American writer, who has tactfully said something to the effect that the "United States is partly responsible, not in the sense of instigating Israel but in the sense that the general logic of the Reagan administration's foreign policy facilitates such actions and creates the right atmosphere for them." These are extremely serious words.

James Reston has drawn his government's attention to the fact that keeping silent over what has happened will open the door to enormous dangers.

To accept that it is Israel's right to carry out this raid under the pretext of self-defense means accepting the same action if carried out by any nuclear power against any potential enemy.

Each of India and Pakistan, for example, have the capability to manufacture an atomic bomb and each of them suspects the intentions of the other. Consequently, and according to this logic, it is the right of India to raid and destroy the nuclear reactors in Pakistan and it is the right of Pakistan to do the same thing against India.

Another possibility is still more serious than this one: The hostility between Russia and China is well known. China has managed to manufacture the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb but it hasn't yet been able to manufacture the means to transport these bombs to their targets. Here also it becomes the right of Russia to raid and destroy China's nuclear installations under the pretext of self-defense. The argument is more acceptable here than in the case of Israel and Iraq. What makes Russia wait until China becomes capable of retaliating and why shouldn't Russia delay with such a raid the Chinese nuclear power for dozens of years?

Therefore, the entire world will become a more dangerous place and will progress toward more perils if the precedent of the Israeli attack is allowed to pass without adequate reaction from the world generally and from the United States in particular.

The second point is that the number of nuclear reactors already constructed or that are under construction in the Third World to which we belong has exceeded 70 nuclear reactors. Some of them are in dangerous countries isolated from the international community, such as South Africa, and others are in countries that are behind us in resources and civilization, such as the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Columbia, Chile and Argentina.

The principle of setting up nuclear reactors is no longer a privilege of the advanced countries.

But the principle which Begin wants to underscore with his raid against the Baghdad reactor is that all countries of the world, excluding the Arab countries, are permitted to build nuclear reactors. As long as the Arabs have not yet accepted Israel, its conquests and its usurpation, then they have no right to build a single nuclear reactor!

I don't know by what logic the world will condone this new principle. Will the Arabs accept it or will it be allowed to go unpunished? I don't know to what extent the Arabs will accept from all those who are their "friends" conciliatory words and harsh facts!

The third point is that all the Arab countries have signed the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty. Thus, they are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency and accept periodic inspection of any nuclear reactor they have. The agency inspected the Baghdad reactor itself only a few months ago.

The only countries in the world that have refused to sign the treaty are France, because of its Gaullist policy which has been rebellious against the domination of the superpowers, India and Pakistan, because of the deep suspicions and the bloody history between them, and Israel and South Africa which cooperate with each other in making atomic bombs.

Signing this treaty and joining this agency was supposed to have provided protection for the participant. This signing and joining is also a pledge on the part of the participant not to use the reactors for military purposes.

But if a country refusing to sign the treaty, such as Israel, attacks a signatory of the treaty, such as Iraq, then what is the use of the treaty and what is the value of the international agency? Why don't all the Arab countries declare their withdrawal from the agency and nullify their signatures on this treaty, unless Israel is punished properly and unless it is compelled to sign the treaty? Israel will not agree to sign it because it is manufacturing atomic bombs, as the entire world knows.

In the 1950's, 'Abd-al-Nasir refused to sign the treaty unless Israel signed it when Israel had started at the time building its famous Dimona reactor.

At the same time, 'Abd-al-Nasir was building a training reactor in Inshas. He did expect the countries which possessed the experience at the time--United States, Russia and Britain only--to refrain from helping him in realizing nuclear progress because of his failure to sign the treaty.

Perhaps few know that this was the direct cause of 'Abd-al-Nasir's recognition of the PRC at a time when such recognition was considered a major crime. His recognition was actually considered so. The world clamored vociferously against Egypt and the United States intensified its intransigence and its fight against Egypt because 'Abd-al-Nasir estimated that China, which was not a member of the UN and which was not committed to international resolutions, was the country which could help Egypt in the nuclear field. This cooperation did actually start secretly at the time.

But even Egypt signed the treaty finally and is in the process of building reactors which it has bought from western companies. Despite this, Israel has refused to respond by signing the treaty even though the United States has asked it to do so.

Why, once again, don't the Arab countries withdraw their signatures and urge other Third World countries to do the same, considering that we are tying ourselves to a bond to which the enemy doesn't tie himself and that it will always be possible to acquire nuclear experience, even if from the devil himself?

The international community must protect the laws it promulgates or accept that these laws be torn to pieces everywhere.

The extremely important fourth point is that the Israeli raid on Baghdad has proven decisively that there is no Arab country which is far from the danger because it has no borders with Israel or because it has no territories occupied by Israel. Israel settled this matter when it extended its aggression to a country with which it has no common borders because this country is in a state of war with it and because it is preparing for scientific progress in the future.

Israel is thus declaring that it is her right to strike Saudi Arabia, Libya or Algeria. With the modern arms, it is no longer impossible to reach the farthest point in the Arab world.

This is a totally new position which Israel has declared with its staging of this raid and with its right to use the pretext of self-defense to strike a target that is 1,000 kilometers away from it.

It is the duty of the Arabs to prepare for this possibility in both the near future and the distant future.

Perhaps this raid will teach the Arabs to take integration seriously and to eliminate the conflict in their broad political lines.

The chaos in the Arab weapon deals is no longer acceptable.

The absence /presumably meaning presence/ of strong and effective defense networks has become a must, before we speak about offensive weapons.

We don't want to reiterate the talk about the Arab money wasted in superficial projects nor about the excessive spending on these superficialities. It is like a man dressed in the richest clothes while his underwear is torn. All this is nothing new to the reader.

Nor do we want to talk about the thousands of Arab minds scattered in all parts of the world.

As usual, we will experience a temporary shock and tell them: Come, we will pay you the highest wages.

O people, it is not at all a matter of wages. It is a matter of well-studied and integrated projects which have a future. It is a matter of guaranteed scientific (freedom) and a matter of a social environment in which science can flourish and becomes possible to apply. It is not enough to have the best seeds in order for these seeds to grow and bear fruit. These seeds have to be planted in the right soil.

A plane is built at present by having Britain produce the engines, Germany the wings, France the fuselage and the United States the precise control instruments.

Despite our limited capabilities, which we need to begin to build up, our political disputes stand between us and this thing Integration which is the only hope for progress.

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CSO: 4304/44

CURRENT UNIVERSITY ISSUES REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Jul 81 pp 30, 31

Article by Labib al-Siba'i: "Young People and the Universities: Determining Rules To Let Faculty Members out on Loan Abroad"

Text/ Rules are to be organized for loaning members of faculties in Egyptian universities out to Arab and foreign universities. According to these, the ratio of members out on loan is not to exceed 25 percent of the members of each faculty, faculty members cannot go out on loan if they are supervising master's or doctoral theses (unless these are completed or on the verge of completion), and the faculty members are not to be connected to participation in scientific research for which contract has been made with research centers inside or outside the university.

Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, president of Cairo University, stated that another condition for loaning out faculty members is that they not have written textbooks for distribution to students which have been in continuous use for a period of 3 years, lest loaning these members out compel students to change the university textbooks required.

Dr Talba 'Uwaydah, president of the University of al-Zaqaziq, declared that a comprehensive survey is to be made of all faculty members who have completed a loan period of 4 years in Arab universities, so that other members besides them in the same fields of specialization, may go out on loan to preserve the Egyptian presence in Arab universities; if it is not feasible to find replacements for them, their loan period can be extended for a fifth or sixth year.

Renewal of loanouts of faculty members is also not to be permitted unless the members spend a period in Egypt equivalent to the period of their previous loanouts, and university instructors are not to be permitted to go out on loan before 3 years have elapsed since their appointment — on condition that the total periods of absence on loan, scholarly missions, and special leaves to accompany a spouse not exceed 10 years during the period of the faculty member's service.

Dr Hasan Hamdi added that it has been decided to consider that faculty members have resigned if they refrain from returning within 1 month of completing their loan periods, on condition that their resignations be withdrawn if they return within a maximum of 6 months.

He stated that it has been decided to treat members on a sabbatical who have been sent on foreign scholarships the same as members on study missions abroad as regards payment of their salary at home and to set out rules on sending faculty members abroad on scholarly missions so that they may be sent out for a period of 1 year which may be renewed once if necessary. People sent on such missions will receive their salary in full at home during the period of the mission provided that upon completion of their mission they present a report on the activities and research they performed abroad.

University faculties have almost completed the process of correcting students' examination papers, and the results of examinations in the faculties will be announced the first week of July. The activities of investigating the grades, for which four committees have been formed in each faculty, have started this week.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, vice president of Cairo University, has stated that it has been decided to set out specific procedures for the investigation committee's activity, covering a review of all levels of questions and the extent to which they are relevant to the faculty's degrees, evaluations set down on the covers of the examination notebooks, /imposition of the condition/ individual committee members not monopolize investigations or activities related to them, the condition that grades and evaluations in subjects the students previously passed and evaluations in subjects in which they failed be set down, and the condition that reports be prepared which include a statistical analysis of the general results of the examinations, the results of the examinations in each subject, and application of the stipulated rules for clemency.

Dr al-'Adawi added that Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, president of the university, has decided to establish an office in each faculty to receive students' complaints following declaration of the results and review them at once to correct them.

Dr Hasan Hamdi described how students could present grievances or contest examination results. He stated that students had the right to present their grievances on examination results as soon as they were announced, in which case a review would be made of their examination papers. If the students felt that the results of the examination were severely contrary to their expectations, review of their examination papers would take place only to investigate the possibility that material errors were made in the examination booklets or investigation lists, such as discrepancies between the grades listed in the investigation lists and the grades in examination booklets or between the total grades to the questions and the total grades the students acquired, in which case the results would be corrected immediately.

With regard to evaluations, the university president said that cases where for instance a student assumed, on his own, that he would obtain a specific grade, then got a grade below that, were a purely discretionary process on the part of the professor and could not be reviewed under any conditions. The university president added that it had been decided to apply a number of general rules to guarantee that justice would be done in making corrections among students, guaranteeing the fact that faculty members would refrain from correcting examination

papers if any of the students presenting themselves for the examination were their spouse or a second cousin or closer relative, that faculty members in every subject would take part in correcting examination papers on those subjects, and that assistant instructors and lecturers would be prohibited from performing correction work on any type of examination.

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BENEFITS, FAVORABLE POINTS OF HIGH DAM REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Jul 81 pp 12-15

/Article by Usamah Mihran: "The Case for the Maligned High Dam!"/

/Text/ After the conclusion of the symposium of the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Culture, it was apparent that Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata's output in defense of the High Dam has not yet been exhausted and that his arguments in replying to the statements made on "the seven errors of the High Dam" will require many more symposia. Thus it has become necessary to renew the discussion with one of the most important people in charge of the construction of the High Dam, who was a minister of agriculture, irrigation and land reclamation for more than 4 years. The discussion began with a statement by Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata.

"Discussion has previously been held on the side effects of the High Dam in the People's Assembly, the Ministry of Irrigation and the national councils concerned. This has all been raised once, twice, a hundred times. Although the matter was settled in the technical sense, each time it is nonetheless being raised again, in the same manner, at the same rate and with the same shallow understanding. None of the forecasts which pessimists raised before or after construction of the High Dam have been realized. Come along with me so we can discuss the truth and ask whether the dam has benefited Egypt or brought it disaster, whether it has wrecked it, as some people say, or built it up, as the evidence and figures say."

The Silt, or Mistake Number One

"People say that the dam is the main reason the land is being deprived of silt and that this has resulted in deterioration of the fertility of the soil and a decline in per-feddan productivity. I have no answer to that more eloquent than these figures:

"Our overall plant production has risen several times over since start of the construction of the High Dam, through an increase in the average per-feddan productivity of wheat from 6.75 ardebbs before construction of the High Dam to 9.01 ardebbs after it.

"Likewise, per-feddan productivity of Syrian corn has risen from 9.11 to 12 ardebbs and cotton from 4.61 to 6.25 kantars. This has been due to a number of reasons.

"The first reason: as the Egyptian soil scientist Dr Mustafa al-Jabali says, the soft grains of silt in the past blocked off the interstices in the soil, resulting in a weakening of soil characteristics and a decline in soil productivity as a consequence of poor ventilation and low permeability of the fine organisms which functioned to create the nutritional compounds necessary for the growth of the plant.

"The second reason: the silt caused a number of problems every year when the channels and waterways filled up. This had an exceptional effect in obstructing all agricultural development projects.

"The third reason: It has been possible to replace the nutritional elements present in the silt following construction of the High Dam by adding 13,000 tons of nitrate lime fertilizer to compensate for the 4 million tons of Nile silt that have been blocked up behind the High Dam and contain the 1,800 tons of nitrogen the land requires."

At this point I asked the former minister of agriculture and irrigation:

"If this is the situation, why do some people say that the shortage of silt following the High Dam is to be considered a major reason for the scraping activities taking place on Egyptian land and the elimination of extensive areas of farmland for the sake of manufacturing red brick to replace brick made out of Nile silt?"

He replied "The scraping activities taking place on the soil in Egypt through the establishment of red brick plants are basically in violation of the law. It is not true that the absence of silt has prevented Egypt from manufacturing brick, which is to be considered a basis for construction and building activity. To the contrary: the silt of the Nile was a burden on the brick industry in Egypt, especially when we realize that the bearing capacity of brick made out of silt ranges from 5 to 10 kilograms per square centimeter, placing a great load on foundations and obstructing the development taking place in the construction brick industry now. The whole world is using clay and sand brick for modern dwelling construction and Egypt, after construction of the High Dam, also began to develop the brick industry by constructing factories for these types."

Water Quality Has Not Changed

With these words, the former minister of agriculture and irrigation concluded his statement on the problem of silt and moved over to another of the seven errors Dr 'Ali Fathi had listed. This error is related to the nature of the water in Lake Nasir. In this area, Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata went on, there is a new fact, to wit:

"Control of the river water and retention of the river's input have led to the emergence of a number of phenomena:

"First, the entire annual input is now retained in Lake Nasir.

"Second, the High Dam itself has become the sole force controlling this input.

"Third, 97 percent of the materials suspended in the water are now retained behind the dam.

"The fourth phenomenon is that permanent irrigation has become a distinctive feature of the Egyptian land; continuous inundation of the land is the method that has come to be followed, and, as a result of that and the spread of building and industry, the rate of water pollution has risen. In spite of these facts, the ratio of the salts dissolved in the Nile water retained in the lake before the flood in 1974, 1975 and 1976 did not exceed 75, 151 and 146 parts per million, respectively, whereas, before construction of the dam, the salt ratio was about 200 parts per million before and 138 parts per million during the flood period. Through studies prepared by the Ministry of Irrigation and Asyut University, it has become possible to reach the following conclusions:

"First, the quality of water in Cairo, calculating the existing ratio of salts, was 170 parts per million in 1976; this ratio has not risen since.

"Second, the Nile water is in a state of equilibrium in terms of alkalinity, salinity and hardness.

"Third, the average salt concentration in Lake Nasir now is lower than it was before the construction of the High Dam.

"Fourth, the salinity in the dam reservoir is increasing in concentration gradually, at a rate ranging from 1 to 3 parts per million per year, no change has occurred in the quality of the Nile water, and no toxicity has occurred, as some people have rumored."

Increase in Soil Salinity and Rise in Groundwater Levels

On the problem of increased soil salinity and the rise in groundwater levels in Egyptian soil, Eng Abu-al-'Ata said:

"It is not true that the High Dam is the cause for the rise in the salt ratio in the ground. The appearance of salt in the soil throughout Egypt preceded construction of the dam. Much of the land in the Governorate of al-Minufiyah especially suffered from a high rate of soil salinity in the forties, compelling us to construct a system of tile drains there then. However, following construction of the High Dam, irrigation water is being provided throughout the year and the dam has become a permanent source of water at all times. Perhaps this temptation has been the main reason why peasants and engineers have been profligate with irrigation water. Even some water quotas for certain crops in some areas have exceeded 300 percent of actual requirements, as a consequence of which the level of water in the ground has gradually risen in some areas. Remediying this phenomenon through irrigation water consumption guidance and the construction of concentrated general and tile drainage systems is the simplest thing possible and the Ministry of Irrigation is about to do it now. The program is about to cover all the land in Egypt; it will do this by the end of 1985 specifically."

The Lie about Scouring and the Collapse of Barrages and Levees

After that, let us move to the problem of scouring in the Nile channel. Is that reality or just an accusation? Is the collapse of barrages and levees as a result of construction of the dam to be expected, or is it all the problem of allegations and the casting of doubt? Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata answered these queries as well, stating,

"One of the most important subjects dealt with by people who talk about the side effects of the dam is that of comprehensive scouring. Many questions have arisen on this subject, on the amount of scouring, the rates of scouring and the speed of its occurrence in the Nile channel.

"The opposition people said in 1956, before the construction of the dam, that scouring in the bottom of the channel would come to 54 meters, that that would occur on four occasions, in each of which there would be scouring to a depth of 14 meters, that most of the scouring would occur in the first 2 years after the construction of the dam, and that comprehensive scouring behind the barrages at Isna would occur in 9 years and behind the barrages at Naj' Hammadi in 12 years. Then it was said that a new delta would emerge at the northern end of the reservoir and that a new channel would be created downstream from Aswan.

"The Nile was diverted in 1964, retention behind the dam started that year, 5 years passed, and none of what the opposition people said happened. However, they did not desist from making accusations and casting doubt. They proceeded once again to voice accusations against the dam on this matter, stating that the river float would be lowered by at least 2 meters after 5 years of operation and by 3 meters after 10 years. The years have passed, but this has not happened. They proceeded to state, in 1976, that 83 percent of the comprehensive scouring would occur 17 years after operation began, that is, by 1985 specifically. They stressed that the depth of the river between Isna and Naj' Hammadi would come to 6.65 /meters/ that below the Naj' Hammadi barrages would come to 8.4 meters, and that below the Asyut barrages would come to 6.4 meters. Responding to these inaccuracies, Dr Yusuf Hammad, professor at Alexandria University, made basic studies in 1977 and presented us with a memorandum containing the following conclusion:

"After /the dam went into/ operation, the Nile channel floor reached a state of equilibrium; its composition is 20 percent soft sand and 80 percent coarse sand. This gives a wholly reassuring indication that no scouring has occurred to a degree that should cause one to be afraid.

"In addition, the Institute for the Study of Side Effects of the High Dam has underlined this fact.

"Another professor, an Egyptian-American, Dr Jamal Mustafa, also presented a detailed study on the problem, and the Soviets and the Swedish consulting firm VPP have offered studies on this subject. The studies all contradicted the pessimists' statements. The most eloquent response was made by the Ministry of Irrigation in 1976, after 12 years had elapsed since the dam began operating; on this problem of scouring the ministry's studies stated that the drop in the Nile floor below the Isna

barrages was no greater than 30 centimeters and that the annual rates of scour which occurred did not exceed the following:

"Between Aswan and Isna, 2.2 centimeters per year.

"Between Isna and Naj' Hammadi, 3 centimeters per year.

"Between Naj' Hammadi and Asyut, 2.5 centimeters per year.

"Between Asyut and Cairo, 0.4 centimeters per year.

"As a result of these facts, the forecasts made on this phenomenon were no greater than those that had been anticipated before the dam was built, which in any event did not reach the danger point.

"In spite of that, the ministry has considered it appropriate to carry out the Tushki Depression Project to eliminate all possibilities, no matter how slight. Proceeding from this premise, we have actually started to construct this depression in the Western Desert and it is now on the verge of completion. It provides the greatest guarantee for eliminating all dangers of scour, since all the drainage from Lake Nasir above the 175 meter /level/ on 1 August will go into this depression."

With these facts, Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata ended his counterattack against the people who are opposed to and cast doubts on the soundness of constructing the dam. However, the issue has not yet been resolved.

The Egyptian Academy of Scientific Culture in conjunction with the Ministry of Irrigation and the Egyptian Society of Engineers has decided to devote a whole week to a re-evaluation of the High Dam.

No one knows when the issue will be resolved, even though it has, from the technical standpoint, been resolved, dozens of times already.

A Heated Symposium

AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI opened the file on the High Dam the week before last. No sooner had some of its side effects been broached than the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Culture held an urgent symposium to re-evaluate the dam, notwithstanding the report by the competent national councils on the soundness of the dam's construction from the technical standpoint and Ministry of Irrigation studies and reports on the soundness of and accuracy of the project from the economic and technical standpoints as well.

A large number of prominent Egyptian engineers and experts in the fields of engineering, agriculture, construction and dams /were in the symposium/.

Heading up the gathering were Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata, former minister of agriculture, irrigation and land reclamation, and Eng Ahmad 'Ali Kamal, former minister of irrigation and secretary of the committee which set out the fundamental studies on construction of the dam.

Also attending the symposium were Dr 'Ali Fathi, former professor at the University of Alexandria, Dr Mustafa Sulayman, professor of engineering at 'Ayn Shams, and other university professors specializing in the field of dams.

The symposium began with a statement by Mr 'Abd-al-Ghani Sa'id, former deputy minister of manpower and head of the symposium, who said:

"The High Dam has been one of a number of projects which have had positive and negative features. In spite of the dam's immense achievements, it did not receive a sufficient amount of study before construction on it started, as a result of the impetuosity of officials at that time and their insistence on completing construction of the dam as soon as possible, considering that it was a national political duty before an economic and technical one.

"Therefore some side effects have appeared which provoke the fears of many scientists now."

At this point Dr Mustafa Sulayman, professor of engineering at 'Ayn Shams, took the floor, saying:

"The High Dam has beneficial points and detrimental ones. I do not deny that. However, truth to tell, the cause of the problem of groundwater and rise in the water table does not lie in the High Dam, as Dr 'Ali Fathi has stated. Rather, the main reason here may be attributed to our misuse of water for irrigation, household uses and industry. Greatest proof of this is the fact that the groundwater level all over the map of Egypt is at levels much higher than that of the Nile itself. How can the High Dam be a danger to Egypt's homes and villages, as some people are bruited it about?

Eng Ahmad 'Ali Kamal, former minister of irrigation, added another item of fact when he took the floor, saying:

"There was no impetuosity of execution in construction of the High Dam, but there was haste, based on fear of a repetition of what happened in 1913, when the total Nile discharge was 42 billion cubic meters while the actual requirements of both Egypt and the Sudan came to 52 billion. Had that occurrence been repreated in the sixties, there would without question have been a drought, and no one could have predicted the consequences of it."

Then came Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata's turn. He took the floor and began a counterattack against Dr 'Ali Fathi's statement, saying:

"The time has come for us to ask ourselves what the dam has given us and what it has taken away from us. This project has given us a great deal. It was not started impulsively, as the lecturer has said, because, according to the facts which are available, I say that there is not a single engineering project which received the study, the time and the research the High Dam received. In addition, this project was the offspring of Western and Eastern thinking both. Swedish, German, American and Italian experts helped set out the studies for it, in addition to the Russian experts who later took charge of carrying the project out. In

addition, when we review the side effects of the dam, we will find that they are like the shade of a building -- we cannot say that they are negative features detracting from the project, as some people rumor. Everything said about these side effects has been answered realistically and through figures, from the first problem, scouring, to the flight of fish because of a paucity of silt.

"In summary, I would like to say that the High Dam is to be considered the greatest achievement in the history of the Egyptian people, in spite of the empty talk and allegations."

11887
CSO: 4504/30

EXPERT OFFERS INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT ON HIGH DAM CONTROVERSY

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Jul 81 pp 16, 17

/Article by Muhammad Nu'man: "The High Dam Case: The Problem Is Unbalanced Growth"/

/Text/ It is not possible to ignore the damage which has befallen the High Dam, as Eng 'Ali Fathi has depicted it; however, attributing this damage to the very existence of the High Dam in reality means offering an explanation that is limited to surface features.

While this limited explanation proceeds from the nature of the country's economic and technological circumstances, imparting a practical character to it, this practical character is also its basic flaw. No one disputes the fact that the High Dam is a massive engineering work, the product of a technology which is very advanced when compared with the irrigation and farming technology that prevails in the country.

For example, to talk about the electric power generated by the High Dam, the current operating revenues from this power are very modest when compared with the costs of the generating plant, and also when compared with the technical level — not to mention the hopes which had been placed on the construction of great electric power sources. This may fundamentally be attributed to the purposes for which the electric power generated is used: it was expected that the industrial sector in the country would expand thanks to the use of electricity, whereas what has happened is that the electric power has been dissipated in other service purposes, and the returns from the use of this power have been very modest. At the same time, the conversion of basin lands to permanent irrigation without the performance of any serious work of the same caliber as the technological achievement which marked the construction of the High Dam to build an extensive system of drains in Upper Egypt and develop those in Lower Egypt has had extensive effects on the rise in the level of water in the ground, above and beyond delays in projects to improve and maintain the soil with the purpose of retaining its fertility.

However, the basic point is that construction of the High Dam, with the resources it has offered to change the irrigation system in Upper Egypt and increase irrigation capacity in Lower Egypt, was not linked to a new agricultural production strategy which would deal with the variables that had arisen in the irrigation system. Indeed, matters became worse when purposeful approaches were actively made

toward the cultivation of more crops that imposed strain on the farmland in Egypt; it is from this that the bad consequences for agricultural production have arisen.

One of the most important elements in the new situation has been the absence of silt and the increased hydraulic capability of the Egyptian irrigation system. Greater emphasis ought to have been placed on farming leguminous crops which are noted for their lower consumption of water and their added ability to concentrate nitrogen in the air in the soil, thanks to the chains of parasitic bacteria on their roots, to make up for some of the deterioration in fertility resulting from the disappearance of the silt.

However, what has happened has been an expansion in cotton farming, which is one of the crops that imposes the greatest load on Egyptian soil and is an important host for a number of insects, as well as having a relatively high consumption of water. In accordance with the estimated increase in water in the irrigation system, expansion in rice growing took place but that happened in the absence of projects to build and develop the drainage system.

The tile drainage project was started after the dam was completed, in 1970, and it is now proceeding at a snail's pace.

Constructing a dam with great capabilities is not an easy matter, especially when the mechanism of agricultural modernization is almost nonexistent. This unbalanced situation is primarily what is responsible for the current disturbances, in the sense that the current damage from the High Dam is the result only of disruption in the existing structure of our economy, which is to be characterized as backward. It was presumed that development in one of its support sectors would lead to an upsurge of activity in other sectors, as one development theory (the theory of unbalanced growth) holds. However, the result was further disruption, which led to a deterioration in the rates of growth of the target support sector (agriculture).

This may be attributed to:

1. The survival of obsolete land tenure relationships in the agricultural sector.
2. Industry's failure to play its part in providing advanced agricultural machinery to raise the technological level of agriculture.
3. The failure to choose a new crop structure which will guarantee flexibility in foreign trade and provide local food and agricultural raw material requirements.
4. The orientation of all economic activity toward services, which has led to a deterioration in the national economy's capacity to function and has contributed to continued obsolescence in scientific research.

Thus the concept of creating development on a well known principle, "creating unbalanced growth," has failed, because the options of economic growth are organically and historically linked to the country's modern economic growth

experiences. To subject the High Dam to an inquisition in the absence of these variables is unjust, as it neglects to take stock of the basic mechanisms of growth in our country. What happened with the High Dam, and what will happen with other projects, is governed by this mechanism.

Eng 'Ali Fathi's Objections

Although Eng 'Ali Fathi builds his objections to the High Dam on the project itself and on the manner in which it was constructed, remedying certain of the side effects which have arisen from it is not an impossibility. Furthermore, predictions of danger from certain other side effects have in some cases been marked by a spirit of exaggeration.

The decline in the fertility of agricultural soil in Egypt is a process that has been going on since the start of cotton cultivation, and we cannot imagine that cotton farming will keep up, at its current broad scale, at the expense of other basic crops, without adding further to the deterioration of the agricultural soil. The side effects of the High Dam alone are not responsible for this, although we do not concede that the absence of silt has had an effect on soil fertility.

It is from this problem that the processes of comprehensive scouring in the river channel as well as on the shores have resulted, although the establishment of a number of barrages, as recommended by the experts who took part in building the dam, will reduce these effects, which are in reality wholly different from those in the Sudd region to which Eng 'Ali Fathi compared them: the latter consists of rocks and cataracts obstructing the course of the river which are not subject to human control. In addition, the construction of such barrages would, in the time of floods, permit greater volumes of water to flow, making partial use of the silt brought with the water and pursuing the system of construction through numerous barriers without disturbing the basic function of storage behind the High Dam.

In another area — the points raised concerning exposure to poisoning by water through the effects of chemical fertilizers and pesticides — the use of fertilizers and pesticides in this constant fashion would still be wholly present even if there were no High Dam, in view of the crop sequence followed.

In addition, Eng 'Ali Fathi has raised objections to the fact that peasants are compelled to scrape /soil off/ the land. This in reality is a confused notion of the scraping issue, because peasants in Egypt now acquire the soil needed for common fertilizer only from the large clods left over from plowing. In some areas of the Governorate of al-Fayyrah the concern has reached the point where landowners deprive peasant tenants from collecting anything but large clods in order to make fertilizer, and even if scraping to make ordinary fertilizer take place, that does not go beyond the legal limit for scraping, which is 25 centimeters -- and ultimately this returns to the land on which the scraping took place and contains garbage materials.

However, the issue which is really the most serious, and is expressive of disequilibrium in the country, in the technical balance, is that of scraping off land and selling it to brick plants, which are constantly increasing in size and number in

spite of the legal prohibitions. The continuous expansion in the number of such plants bespeaks a backwardness in construction technology in the country and a failure to develop other alternatives to use as building materials. This is a most serious issue, since it threatens the entire surface layer of the farmland. As regards the spread of plants and algae in the river channel, the metal systems installed above barrages and bridges for security purposes in the past have been unsuccessful in retaining many of these and have helped the performance of periodic cleansing operations (although a long time passed between each period). Once these metal systems were removed, the plants and algae in the river proceeded to proliferate. Is there anything to prevent them from being restored? We do not believe so. This will solve a problem which is most critical.

The objection bearing on the deposition of a new delta by the dam (after hundreds of years) is realistic, in the light of current circumstances of scientific development, but not inevitable in terms of future possibilities. In addition, the danger that new river channels will be created under the influence of this delta is to be doubted, in view of man's increasing capacity to control rivers; the Nile created its current delta and chose and modified its channels in the context of the hydraulic freedom guaranteed it by the fact of the development of human society following man's appearance on earth, not to mention the river's choices in far distant geological epochs when all natural changes occurred in total freedom. Time has shown the possibility of controlling the course of the river. Hasn't the river ceased moving to the east, as it did before, thanks to the levees built on both its sides?

Looking to the future from a premise of permanency is very harmful, but looking with sincerity with something akin to a serious fear for the future of the country and the generations to come is truly noble.

The deeply-versed Egyptian irrigation engineer 'Ali Fathi has taught us a lesson, which is how one can be sincere in his thinking and continue to propound it, that is, how one can have a cause. It is a lesson of which our generation -- which is totally preoccupied by opportunities to look for work in some oil countries above all else -- should be conscious.

11887
CSO: 4504/30

BACKGROUND OF 'BLOODBATH' STUDIED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 9 Jul 81 p 8

[Commentary: "Iran's Blood-bath"]

[Text] Iran seems to be indulging in a masochistic orgy of blood-letting. State terror and terrorism, in the background of political feuds and a mad struggle for power, have culminated in the massacre of June 28, followed by more street riots, more killing and more executions.

The latest round started when, after President Banisadr's impeachment and dismissal --from an office to which he had been elected with a massive 75 per cent vote--, his opponents clashed with protestors who objected to the hurried and, they felt, unjustified verdict given by the Majlis. The issue was sought to be settled with the bullet and baton, with the knife and the knout. With street battles raging in many towns, hundreds of the ex-President's supporters were rounded up and more than one hundred were summarily executed. The charge invariably was defiance of the Constitution; but charges did not matter, apparently no trials were held, no evidence taken, and no judicial verdicts given. Defiance of the ruling party's diktat was considered crime enough, and the sentence usually awarded was death. Not unexpectedly, counter-terrorism escalated, and seemingly the main target was Ayatollah Beheshti--recognised as No. 2 in the clerical hierarchy--, the presiding eminence of the revolutionary tribunals and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who had supervised the campaign of severely punishing all manner of dissent with ruthless single-mindedness. Along with him, 73 prominent IRP leaders were killed when the party's headquarters was blown up, and the Governor of the local jail where most executions took place was also gunned down.

Whose hand?

It was a carefully-planned plot, a well-timed operation. In the country's prevailing maelstrom, and our dependence on the Western media for news, it is not easy to decide which minds plotted the plot and which hands pressed the switch to further spread violence and bloodshed. Some IRP leaders have blamed 'the great Satan' and American or Iraqi agents. That foreign hands are active in Iran is most probably true, and their aim can only be the country's destabilisation. But not much foreign aid has been required to create conditions of chaos and instability, and the in-fighting which has been intensified over recent months seems to be independent of foreign guidance.

Certain factors are plain. The loose united front which fought and toppled the Shah's regime crumbled soon after the final victory. Then, the country's voters were and remain ambivalent about the direction which Iran should follow. What is more, having acquired control of the Majlis, the IRP sought to establish a monopoly of power. For a time, the tandem government was kept in balance by the mediation of Ayatollah Khomeini, who until recently was accepted as the supreme arbiter; but when he abandoned this role, it was open war. Another factor that made for internecine conflicts is that increasingly the IRP leaders became intolerant of disagreement or dissent. While castigating American agents or remnants of the Shah's regime, they engaged in battle against elements that had played a major role in the struggle for liberation. Blame has been thrown on various factions--Mujahideen-i-Khalq, Banisadr's men, minority groups--for the Tehran blast, without in iota of evidence to substantiate the grave charge. And the IRP's intolerance seems to be based on an arrogant assumption of the right to dictate to the others. Many an Ayatollah claims that he speaks with the voice of God; therefore, any opposition to his injunctions is opposition to Islam and the Creator.

The future

Not even the war imposed on Iran by Iraq or the deteriorating economic situation helped to bring about a reconciliation between the warring groups. When, on the one hand, volunteers were being recruited by different groups to buttress the army in the country's defence, on the other hand, these same groups were found engaged in mini-battles among themselves. An irrational attitude to politics, the absence of civil liberties, a blind lust for power, and the capacity to kill all opponents, have made a mockery of Iran's democracy and added to the turmoil and chaos. Whether Ayatollah Khomeini can deal with the existing situation has become uncertain. And if, in the coming days and weeks, Prime Minister Rajai's appeal for calm is ignored and the blood-bath continues, the portents are ominous and even Iran's survival as a nation State may be at stake.

It must therefore, be realised by all political parties that unless they can work out a sensible path to rapprochement among themselves, Iran's Islamic revolution and the country itself can be placed in grave jeopardy.

CSO: 4600/96

GOVERNMENT GRANTS SUBSIDY TO INVENTORS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Jul 81 p 16

[Text] The cabinet of the Iranian Islamic Republic met yesterday morning under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i and opened the meeting with readings from the glorious Koran.

During this meeting, which lasted more than three and one-half hours, Prime Minister Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i and Minister of Executive Affairs Nabavi presented reports on the political matters of the day, on the presidential election, on the mid-term parliamentary elections and on the positions and circumstances of seditious and belligerent groups in relation to their background, their way of thinking and their armed anti-national acts. Later, Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the minister of foreign affairs, referred to the treacherous conspiracy of the imperialist and Zionist news agencies that have related the crash of the Argentine plane to the transfer of arms from the Zionist regime to Iran and in this respect, he enumerated the fabrications and lies of these news agencies and circles. He also recalled the ever-increasing influence of the Islamic revolution among the various segments of the Muslim people throughout the world and stressed the magnificent celebration of the Jerusalem day that can lay the foundation for a genuine and decisive start of Muslim unity and the reconquest of the Holy Land from its Zionist occupiers.

During this meeting, the issue pertaining to the contracts on atomic energy and IBM computers was submitted. It was discussed and reviewed and a decision was reached. Subsequently, the proposal by the Ministry of Industry pertaining to the payment of 50 million rials to the National Organization for Scientific and Industrial Research was approved as a subsidy to inventors and discoverers and in order to carry out industrial research on the basis of the 1981 budget act.

CSO: 4640/66

BACKGROUND OF NEWSPAPER CLOSURES REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 6-7

[Article by Phil Davison]

[Text]

IRAN'S MUSLIM fundamentalists, in control of the government, judiciary and legislature, have silenced domestic press opposition and restricted freedom of speech. In the past year, the clergy-backed government has closed down more than 20 opposition newspapers and driven critical political pamphleteers back underground, where they once operated against the Shah's regime. More recently, Ayatollah Khomeini has asked Iranians to watch one another and report any 'counter-revolutionary' gossip.

In the euphoric first few months of the Islamic revolution, when soldiers and revolutionaries paraded with red carnations in their rifle barrels, the streets of Tehran hummed with political and religious discussions, publications, posters and tape recordings. The freedom of expression was stunning: while the Iranian army was busy cruising ethnic Kurdish rebels in the west, one could buy Kurdish guerrilla posters or cassettes of their music in Tehran.

Despite the Islamic nature of the revolution, communist literature and portraits of Marx and Lenin were on sale everywhere. As far as Ayatollah Khomeini, spearhead of the revolution, was concerned, Iranians could criticise him or his followers at the risk of nothing more than a fist fight.

The gradual erosion of freedom of expression began a year ago when the independent daily newspaper *Bamdad* was forced to close down after crowds of Islamic fundamentalists had occupied its offices on

several occasions. The popular daily *Ayandegan* was shut down by the authorities, as were the organ of the communist Tudeh party, *Mardom*, and some 20 smaller publications.

Even with those papers gone, opposition to the clergy's overwhelming role in the post-revolutionary establishment was still expressed in the dailies *Mizan*, which supported the bourgeois policies of former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and *Islamic Revolution*, published by then President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. The offices of *Mizan* (which means 'scales of justice') were vandalised last November and slogans such as 'death to liberals' were painted on its walls.

Mizan's closure was ordered following an editorial last April, when it questioned whether Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti had the right to hold the position of leader of the dominant Islamic Republican Party (IRP) at the same time as that of Iran's chief justice. The closure brought a strong reaction from Bani Sadr, whose *Islamic Revolution* was then left as the only publication critical of the fundamentalists.

'We must defend freedom at any price, and especially freedom of the press,' the president said. 'If a newspaper insults me, I do not want it prosecuted because I know, and past experience makes it clear, that tyranny over the press is the beginning of complete tyranny.' After a brief reappearance at the end of April, *Mizan* was closed down again but this time it was not alone. *Islamic Revolution* was also

banned, effectively silencing opposition. Bani Sadr's paper had annoyed the authorities for many months through its forthright criticism, particularly because of the regular 'President's Diary' column, in which Bani Sadr attacked the direction of the revolution and often even Khomeini.

Politically, however, his presidency gave him little more power than a veto over the appointment of cabinet ministers and the newspaper column was his strongest influence over the Iranian people. In the column, he had attacked all strata of post-revolutionary Iran, including the clerical-backed government's long refusal to negotiate the release of the American hostages.

The press closures leave two major morning and two evening newspapers in Iran, all four supporting the line of the fundamentalists and the government. The morning papers are *Azadegan* and *Islamic Republic*, the latter the organ of the Islamic Republican Party which is the country's major power bloc. One of its founders was Ayatollah Beheshti, the IRP leader who was among more than 70 religious and political figures killed by a huge bomb at the party's Tehran headquarters last month.

The evening papers are *Kayhan* and *Ettelaat*, both of which describe themselves as independent but support the line of the present government. The state radio and television, officially known as 'the voice and vision of the Islamic republic', are directly under the control of the IRP. They reflect no opposition and often broadcast the speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini or other religious leaders in full, sometimes several times a day. The long-standing official Pars news agency functioned under the Shah's regime but its executives were largely purged after the revolution.

Having tightened the screws on the domestic press, Khomeini has now called on Iranians to watch one another and report anything suspicious to the authorities. 'From now on, you are all members of the intelligence organisation,' he said. In an article along the same lines, the IRP's paper *Islamic Republic* told Iranians: 'You may hear lots of things on a bus, in a taxi, in a doctor's office and public places about political issues. Inform the officials of every bit of information you may come across and they will investigate and identify the counter-revolutionaries.'

CSO: 4600/113

MINISTRY ANNOUNCES UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PLAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 81 p 2

[Text] The Unemployment Compensation Plan will go to the Islamic Consultative Assembly after reviewal by workers and those involved in labor and workers' problems. With this Plan, unemployed persons will receive up to 75 percent of their net pay.

The deputy minister of labor and social affairs announced that in regards to the issue of unemployment compensation, which has been an objective of workers from the beginning of the revolution, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has prepared the Unemployment Compensation Plan. According to the Plan, the aim of implementing unemployment compensation is to support the labor force at times of involuntary unemployment, to protect the relative purchasing power and standard of living of unemployed workers and to prepare grounds properly for the implementation of the government policy of employment and effective utilization of human resources, to achieve the goals of economic and social development in the country. The basic principles of the Plan are as follows:

1. With consideration for Principle 24 and Paragraph 12 of Principle 3 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, unemployment compensation shall be considered as a protective institution for the labor force, which, on the one hand, shall provide resources to protect the relative purchasing power of workers who are willing to work but who, involuntarily, have lost their jobs and, on the other, shall provide the opportunity for the implementation of an employment policy within the framework of a labor economy by preparing for a national culture of employment; providing educational standards and vocational, directional, and professional training; transferring workers; providing workers with identification cards; making the law of supply and demand in the job market understood; regulating supply and demand in the job market; and putting people to work.

2. In connection with Principle 28 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the implementation of the Unemployment Compensation Law, on the one hand, shall deal with the right of the individual to be properly employed and to enjoy social security and, on the other, shall emphasize the duty of the government to create jobs.

3. In accordance with Principle 29 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the expenses for the implementation of the Unemployment Compensation Plan shall be provided from general revenues and from those from the participation of the people. Hence, the tripartite partnership of workers, employers, and the government has been accepted in principle. On this basis, with consideration for the results obtained from previous studies which estimate the rate of compensation should be between 3 and 5 percent of the wages paid, and with consideration for the economic situation and conditions, . . . to work, the pay of the worker during his unemployment shall be less than his pay at the time of employment. But to ensure a minimal livelihood, this amount shall not be less than the legal minimum wage.

7. [as published] In order to ensure employment incentives, payment of dues, the procedure for implementing the program, the participation of the government in the program, the time period for the payments, and other protective measures at this stage, unemployment compensation dues shall be set at 3 percent. With consideration for experience gained through the implementation of the program, steps shall be taken to increase or decrease the level of participation of each of the above-mentioned groups.

4. In connection with Principle 29 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, unemployment compensation is a right of everyone. On this basis, all employees of all economic sectors are covered by unemployment compensation. But, considering the fact that the fund requires time to consolidate its financial situation, action should be taken to determine the eligible units and regions in a way that would provide this stability to a certain extent. Therefore, in the beginning, those units and regions will be selected which enjoy more economic stability.

5. Considering the responsibilities of the government for welfare support and other applications of social security, unemployment compensation shall be compulsory.

6. Unemployment compensation protects those workers who have lost their jobs under involuntary conditions and whose income has been cut off. This compensation shall be provided from the beginning of unemployment to the time of re-employment, based on the length of time unemployment compensation dues have been paid.

8. The rate of compensation to unemployed workers shall be determined by the number of dependents.

9. The determination of fines and control of workers and employers shall be based on justifications and guidance. And procedures shall be followed which shall compensate for the losses and damages to the fund without seriously endangering the livelihood of the worker or the economic organization of the employer.

10. The fund shall consist of an organization under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and shall have separate financial and administrative guidelines in accordance with national administrative, political, social, and economic exigencies.

11. The Unemployment Compensation Fund shall be a government organization managed on the basis of the tripartite partnership of workers, employers, and the government. The above-mentioned groups shall enact their partnership through the Council of the fund, which shall be the highest decision-making authority to determine the policies and management of the fund.

12. In order to prevent the multiplicity of arbitrative authorities, to ensure a united policy, as well as to avoid organizational expansion, arbitration of the differences resulting from the implementation of the law shall be conferred, as far as possible, upon the arbitration authorities cited in the Labor Law. In this manner, the arbitration of differences between the worker-employer, fund-employer, and fund-worker, in their primary stages shall be the responsibility of the workshop committees and in the investigation stage will be the responsibility of the arbitration commission. Only in the event of differences between the employer and the fund, when the subject of the arbitration exceeds 200,000 rials, shall the case be referred to the overseeing committee, upon the request of one of the parties.

13. In regulating labor relations and adherence to the accepted principles, the Unemployment Compensation Fund shall avoid interference in the issues and disputes concerning labor relations and the decision of the arbitrating authorities shall determine dismissals from or leaving employment and guilt or innocence.

14. The Unemployment Compensation Fund may establish an independent organization for the collection of unemployment compensation dues. In addition, the Fund shall be authorized, if necessary, to confer this duty upon another government organization.

15. The total wages paid to workers are subject to unemployment compensation dues; however, with consideration for social security and the necessity of a just distribution of income, a ceiling shall be determined for unemployment compensation payments.

16. In connection with the goals of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in order to coordinate the national economic goals with those of social security, the government must devise a proper plan to assist those who are not included in the Unemployment Compensation Law, to be implemented by the welfare organization.

In this interview, the deputy minister of labor and social affairs said: Later studies have predicted that the implementation of unemployment compensation would be a step towards the abolition of Article 33 of the Labor Law. He expressed hope that with this plan, unemployed individuals will be able to receive maximum of 75 percent of their net pay. If these unemployed individuals serve in the Labor Army [Sepah-e Kar] under the supervision of the government in public-related affairs and in villages, they will receive their full salary. In conclusion, he asked all the workers, those involved in worker and labor issues, and the experts on social and human problems to send their views and suggestions to the Office of Projects and Plans of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs as soon as possible, to complete the Unemployment Compensation Plan to be sent to the Cabinet and the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

9593
CSO: 4640/55

IRAN

RADIO-MOSCOW BROADCASTS CRITICIZED BY SPOKESMAN NABAVI

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Jul 81 p 9

[Text] Yesterday, before noon, brother Engineer Behzad Nabavi, the deputy minister of executive affairs and spokesman for the government, took part in a press and radio-television interview responding to the various questions of correspondents concerning the issues of the day:

The War Issue

As an introduction, he first said: In the name of God the Compassionate and the Merciful.

Regarding the war, as before, we must pay attention to it. All the efforts of the enemy are directed towards diverting our attention to other issues. The Islamic army has been victorious and nothing of significance has been accomplished by the other side. The latest victory was yesterday (the day before yesterday), which is clearly evident in the attacks on the electrical facilities of Iraq, which has lost its aggressive power; and its reaction has been either retreat or immobility. For this very reason, it has begun activities on the political scene and has made a proposal which includes the following:

1. No use of force in resolving the differences between the countries;
2. No interference in the affairs of countries; 3. Open shipping through the Straits of Hormoz. The goal of Saddam in proposing these issues is to prove that the Persian Gulf is not open to shipping. However, everyone knows that open shipping is assured and even our armed forces are protecting safe shipping in the Persian Gulf.

Furthermore, it is Saddam who has resorted to the use of force and has interfered in the internal affairs of other countries. Naturally, when he stops this, the conditions for a cease-fire will have been met. It is he who must stop the use of force. Nabavi added: The

enemy, through its vast propaganda, wants to defile the face of our revolution. And, therefore, it pretends that Iran's position is in support of the West. Mr Nabavi added: It is interesting that Radio Israel broadcasts that Iran has purchased arms from Israel. But they have been unskillful in the broadcast of this report. Israeli radio has announced that Iran purchased arms and ammunition from Israel [as published].

Engineer Nabavi added: On the battlefronts, the war is progressing to the benefit of the Islamic army. God willing, we will hear even better news in the future. I must thank our combatant brothers who have become more steadfast in their objectives despite the internal events and the Zionist and imperialist propaganda. Every day their blows are harsher on the enemy.

The Bombing of Southern Lebanon

Brother Nabavi then referred to the bombing of southern Lebanon and said: The tragedies created by Israel in southern Lebanon are similar to those created by Saddam in southern Iran. Nabavi added that the government of Iran declares its sympathies with the Lebanese and Palestinian people and, moreover, it offers to send them any of its material or spiritual resources possible. The government of Iran is sorry /that a U.S. conspiracy has involved the most powerful forces of the region (Iran and Iraq) in a war, in order that Israel can massacre our defenseless brothers/ [in boldface]. Israel, who knows how Iran and the brother nation of Iraq could help, has taken the maximum advantage of this issue to put pressure on Lebanon and Syria. Egypt, too, makes the best of it to put pressure on Libya.

Nabavi added: Islamic countries must put pressure on Iraq to stop its aggression, so that Iran can go to the aid of the Lebanese and Palestinian brothers.

Elections

The government spokesman then referred to the escalation of the activities of the people for the elections and said: While the presidential candidates are all within the forces in line with the imam, the elections are becoming more expansive. For this reason, the positions of the opponents have also expanded. This shows how important the elections are from their points of view.

Engineer Nabavi then spoke on the boycott of the elections by opposing groups, referring to the recent communique issued by the National Front to boycott the elections, and said: The National Front never issued a harsh communique in the entire course of its history during the shah's regime. At least now it has issued such a harsh communique. Put this communique alongside the propaganda of the foreign radios. Brother Nabavi added: The Western press propagandizes that

the people will not participate in the elections so that the former president, elected with 11 million votes, would remain legitimate.

And the Hezb-e Demokrat [Democrat Party] has declared 2 Mordad [24 Jul] a day of unity. Also, HURRIYET newspaper, published in Turkey, has quoted the Mojahedin announcing that 2 Mordad will be the first day of an uprising.

But the reason for their efforts to meet this day in such a manner is hidden in the nature of the elections. Since no good has come to them from the shah, Reza Pahlavi, or Bakhtiyar, they now want a president instead. And the foreign press says that the people will not participate in the elections. And Radio Israel, endorsing the communique of the Monfeqin [Hypocrites] (Mojahedin-e Khalq), has announced that on 2 Mordad, Iran will become a blood bath, in order to discourage the people from coming out of their houses.

Engineer Nabavi added regarding this issue: Those people who hurried with open arms to meet bullets and threw themselves in front of tanks in order to prevent the influence of the foreigners in the country are not afraid of such poisonous propaganda. They will participate in the elections more united and consolidated, because the counterrevolution will not stop its counterrevolutionary propaganda and activities. For instance, this morning, our brother 'Askar Owlad, who was a presidential candidate, was attacked by counterrevolutionary elements and was taken to a hospital. One of the attackers was killed and another captured. /It is quite clear why people such as 'Askar Owlad are assassinated and who assassinates them. They intend to prevent the presidential elections/ [in bold-face].

People, Our Intelligence Organization

Brother Nabavi added: Another issue is the capture of a large segment of the members of the Peykar group. The operations were so vast that the group could not believe it. Of course, it must be pointed out that our intelligence organization has been and is the people. The people do these services which have, fortunately, included an important segment of the Peykar organization. In these captures, many of their operations and group policies have been exposed. Mr Nabavi said in this connection: For a while, we were even suspecting some of the authorities and we were asking why these coupons were being sold on the streets and where so many coupons had come from. /After taking over the Peykar group house, hundreds of gasoline coupons and coupons for the people's necessities were found in this house/ [in boldface]. It became clear that these so-called pro-people and pro-working-class groups had been forging coupons, which shows the nature of these groups. It becomes clear how these groups made their living. /In the internal analytical assessment of the group obtained from this organization, there is reference to the

internal organizational crisis from which they suffer very much, and they have finally connected it with the universal crisis of communism/ [in boldface]. Of course, they did not put this analysis at everyone's disposal. It was only available to their leaders, who were shocked after being captured and who confessed immediately to all the facts. Another issue is the operation of the group. Nowadays, they have resorted to explosions, bombings, and throwing Molotov cocktails which, from a military standpoint, are worthless. /I am wondering how these groups have sunken to such depths/ [in boldface].

Nabavi added: In the past, when they wanted to assassinate someone, they would try not to even harm the driver. But these gentlemen go to mosques and place bombs. They take their instructions line by line from their leaders. /This action is similar to those of the Mafia, which are carried out according to a plan/ [in boldface]. They want to demonstrate that they still exist. /They suppose the more they do this, the more the people will leave the scene [in boldface], whereas, after the explosion at the central office of the Islamic Republican Party, we saw that the Friday prayers of that week were performed more gloriously than ever.

The Soviet Government Must Explain

Engineer Nabavi added: Another issue is the position of Radio Moscow, which must be discussed. Nabavi said: The position of the Soviet Union is clear in regards to the revolution. Both at the time of Mirza Kuchek Khan and before the revolution, the Soviet Union had declared many times that they supported the Iranian revolution. But the statement of last week from Radio Moscow does not show this and it is even worse than those by the B.B.C. and the Voice of America. For instance, on 24 Tir [15 July], in a report from Tehran, it said that the pasdaran and the police of Tehran used tear gas and fire arms to disperse the supporters of Bani-Sadr. They must explain this to us. Or, it has announced that in Kurdistan, eight soldiers who wanted to join the opponents were executed by the Tehran government. Or, it has announced that Iran summoned several military units from the front in order to put down the increasing demonstrations in Tehran. Unfortunately, /these kinds of actions can have unpleasant effects on the relations between the two countries/ [in boldface]. The government spokesman continued and in regards to lowering inflation, said: The decrease in the inflation rate compared to the previous months can be good news. The Central Bank has announced that the prices of several items which had been priced by the government have decreased and this shows that the government serves the people.

Brother Nabavi, in responding to a question by one of the correspondents concerning the silence of human rights organizations about the bombing of Lebanon, said: When Elqaniyan and Khorram were executed in Iran, they (the human rights people and the United Nations)

started to make noises and the transitional government went to the imam to stop the executions. Mr Nabavi added: But, concerning the bombing of southern Lebanon, it (the Security Council) only reprimanded that the disturbances are to be prevented and it should be important to them that all these defenseless people are rolling in blood.

Nabavi added: See how the Western press reflected the riots of the Mojahedin-e Khalq on 30 Khordad [20 Jun] while they did not report this horrible and awful bombing. Also, see how the Western press wanted to stack the deck and force on the revolution people such as Nazih, Matindaftari and Lahiji, who were all either Freemasons or functionaries of the West.

Aid to Southern Lebanon

In regards to the aid of the government to Southern Lebanon, Engineer Nabavi said: The issue was raised in the Cabinet that we might send health and medical aid, but we might not be able to send very much in military aid. They will forgive us for this. They even know of our resources regarding health and medical aid. Brother Nabavi, in regards to the rumor of a decrease in the price of oil, said: This is the kind of atmosphere created by the Western press. They suggest to an oil producing country that another country had reduced its price and wonder why we do not do the same. These suggestions which create uncertainty continue as far as forcing the OPEC member countries to reduce their oil prices, in order to destabilize oil prices. But the source of all these actions are the oil cartels.

9593
CSO: 4640/61

STUDENTS CONDUCT POLITICAL AGITATION IN INDIA

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 28

[Article by Sumanta Banerjee]

[Text]

IRAN'S POLITICAL conflict has spilled over to India. The 10,000 or so Iranians studying in engineering colleges, medical institutions and universities in a number of Indian cities have split into two opposing groups — one supporting Ayatollah Khomeini, the other giving allegiance to the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq and the Fedayeen-e-Khalq.

The leftwingers, who support Bani Sadr, appear to be in a minority. A small pro-Moscow section — the Tudeh party members and sympathisers — are behind Khomeini.

The Tehran government has approached the Indian external affairs ministry to screen the admission of Iranian students to Indian universities, so that those belonging to groups opposing it can be excluded. Apart from some Iranians studying in India on government scholarships, or who are sponsored by Iran as part of the India-Iran cultural exchange programme, most Iranian students in Indian universities are there off their own bat. Tehran's request, conveyed through an official delegation from Iran has not yet received an official response from the Indian government.

Divisions among Iranian students in India became apparent soon after Khomeini came to power. Most of these students — who before the revolution held frequent demonstrations in Delhi, Bombay and other Indian cities — opposed Khomeini's concept of the Islamic state.

They objected to the imposition of some Islamic customs, like the veiling of women and the ban on music, and eventually banded together into an organisation called the All-India Students Association (AIISA).

Tehran watched these developments closely. It sent a representative, Hojatoleslam Emadi, to Poona where there are about 3,000 Iranian students. Emadi addressed groups of Iranians asking them to oppose those who were 'anti-Islam'. Not long after the speech a group of pro-Khomeini Iranian students attacked the Poona office of the AIISA.

Ironically, the anti-Khomeini students had to face similar harassment during the Shah's reign when agents of Savak, Iran's secret police monitored Iranian student activity in India and sometimes assaulted them if they took part in anti-Shah demonstrations. In those days Iranian students protesting in Indian cities wore masks. One Iranian student now at Delhi university said: 'We may have to go back to those days, since Khomeini is using the same methods as the Shah did.'

According to the AIISA: 'Our activities in the past included the exposing of the authoritarian Shah, and later of his so-called democratic government under Shahpour Bakhtiar. We have always stood for a democratic and secular Iran, where the people will be ruled in a truly democratic atmosphere.'

'We will stand up for those causes, which are cherished by the Indians also. It is unfortunate that the people of Iran who, after years of long drawn-out struggle succeeded in throwing out the Shah, are today faced with a situation where democratic rights are suppressed and have to wage another battle to combat the reactionary and anti-secular policies of the ruling clergy.'

The anti-Khomeini sentiments of these Iranian students have not yet taken the form of open demonstrations. When anti-Shah protests were organised in the past, the Indian government used to round up some of the leaders and extradite them to Iran — presumably in deference to Tehran, on which India depended for oil.

Following the attack in Poona, the AIISA appealed to the Indian government to protect Iranian students from further assaults. So far, the Indian authorities have maintained a non-committal stance — there has not been any case of extradition recently — and are probably awaiting the emergence of a more orderly state of affairs in Iran before they take any decision on their Iranian 'guests'.

CSO: 4600/113

JERUSALEM EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM SEEKS ETHNIC INTEGRATION

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Yitzhak Shor: "Accelerated Integration"]

[Text] Tensions in Jerusalem revolve around three conflicting groups: Jews and Arabs, secular Jews and religious Jews, Sefardi and Ashkenazi Jews. The educational system is the only social system which succeeds in blunting at least one glaring contrast--the ethnic one. It works persistently and systematically to accelerate the integration process, especially in the public schools.

Jerusalem has five main types of schools: public, public-religious, independent, special, Arab.

The public schools enroll 56 percent of the Jewish children in the city, compared to 74 percent nation-wide. They are the most integrated, dealing with educational needs of students of different socio-economic backgrounds. Interestingly, they include one religious (Conservative) school, as well as two experimental schools. In 1982 a new public school with a Labor orientation will open its doors.

Religious Schools--42 Percent

The public-religious schools enroll 28 percent of the city's Jewish children, compared to 20 percent nation-wide. Despite the religious education, groups of parents have taken their children out of those schools and established separate schools which they consider more religious and more nationalistic. Those are the Noam and Horev schools. The public-religious system also includes three HABAD (Lubavitz hasidim) schools, which are independent yet do not belong to Agudat Yisrael's independent system. The public-religious schools also include integrated as well as sectarian schools. Some are co-ed, while others are either boys' or girls' schools.

Agudat Yisrael's independent schools enroll 14 percent Jewish children in the city, compared to 5.7 percent in the rest of the country. Alongside, though not part of it, are state subsidized Talmud Torah (religious academy) schools which reflect the philosophy of various hasidic groups.

Separate special education schools only account for 2 percent of Jewish students, but many regular schools have special ed classes which encompass 7 percent of all Jewish students.

Jordanian Curriculum in Arab Schools

Arab education is divided into at least two systems--a city system, in which Hebrew and civics are taught, and a private system, which uses a Jordanian curriculum. Next year the city system will start using the Jordanian curriculum, beginning in first through sixth grade. The reason for this decision, reached by the city schools division and the Arab education and culture department of the Ministry of Education, is the refusal of Arab institutions of higher learning to accept Arab high school graduates who do not have an Arab diploma. Most of the graduates turn to Jordan, while a few study at the West Bank, Damascus, Egypt, or Europe and America.

One of the weaknesses of Arab education in Jerusalem is the lack of willingness of the parents to send their children to pre-mandatory schools. According to Member of Knesset Tamar Eshel, who is in charge of education in the Jerusalem municipality, parents are not willing to pay even 15 shekels per month to educate their children at age 3 or 4. Most public pre-mandatory schools charge 280 shekels per month.

Compulsory Kindergartens Swallow up Pre-Schools

Of 450 classes missing now in Jerusalem, at least 100 are pre-school classes. Knesset Member Tamar Eshel said that, especially in new neighborhoods, the compulsory kindergartens swallow up the pre-schools. The government is not willing to give one shekel to the building of schools for ages 3-4. For older children the government must allocate funds, and even there the money is late. The city has great difficulty getting funds for schools for 4-year-olds in new neighborhoods.

Another problem is the extremely high tuition. This year's pre-school tuition is 28,000 pounds per year. Next year, according to Tamar Eshel, it is expected to rise to 70,000 pounds (7,000 shekels) per year. This year some 1,000 children out of 5,000 were taken out, namely, 20 percent. Next year will be worse.

The new neighborhoods are populated with young couples. All of them are up to their neck in mortgage payments, and depend on the paycheck of both spouses. Without proper solution for the schooling of the young, the mother cannot go to work. The Ministry of Housing builds schools in the new neighborhoods with first through sixth grades, but no pre-schools. The education department officials in the city of Jerusalem are openly worried that it is precisely in the new neighborhoods the schools will have to go into a second shift in 1982.

Integrated Enrollment Zones for First Grade

Yoel Shiftan, director of the city's education department, is a great believer in integration as a means for building a more cohesive society in the next generation. In order for school integration to succeed, those kindergarten children which need special attention have to be brought up to grade level. Kindergartens in poor neighborhoods in the city are 2 to 3 year schools. The teachers work on language skills and cultural enrichment.

In the second educational phase, namely, the elementary level, the city has introduced integrated enrollment zones for first grade. Children from different neighborhoods are enrolled in first grade without specifying a school. The city, aided by principals and teachers of the lower grades, assigns students to various schools of the same type from different areas in a balanced manner. Each year the number of parents who give inaccurate information about their place of residence in order to have their child sent to a better school decreases.

The third phase of integration takes place in the intermediate grades. The educational reform has affected four public schools--Beit Hinuh, Denmark, Rene Cassin, and Ziff. Next year the intermediate grades will be integrated in Rehavia. Parents who originally opposed integration, have now accepted the policy of the city and the Ministry of Education.

Public-religious schools are yet to integrate their intermediate grades.

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CSO: 4323/17

NEW INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS DEVELOPED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 May 81 p 8

[Article by Mordkhay Artzieli: "Industrial Application for Inventions Developed at Negev University"]

[Text] Two revolutionary inventions in the area of plastics and ceramics, the result of research by two scientists recently arrived from the Soviet Union and Romania which was done at the Institute of Applied Research at Ben-Gurion University in the Negev, are being used industrially.

The first invention, credited to Dr Yuli Lieberman, who came 5 years ago from the Soviet Union, is a material stronger than steel and resistant to corrosion. This new material is made of 90 percent sand, 3 percent glass fiber, and the rest special adhesive materials derived from plastic.

This material can be used for making floor tiles for chemical plants, fireproof bricks, decorative coating, and even construction frames usually made of iron. Dr Yoel Schechter, director of the Institute of Applied Research at Ben-Gurion University, says there is no reason why future building may not be made of this material which can replace steel beams.

The industrial application of the invention is done by the Dan-Con Company which was recently established. More than \$1 million were invested in the company by Israeli, Canadian, and American investors. The company will soon build a semi-industrial plant and then a large plant which will employ hundreds of workers. It was disclosed that a large West German company has shown interest in the new material and may enter into partnership.

The second invention is credited to Dr Dov Yoashko who came from Romania 4 years ago, and has since worked for the same institute as Dr Lieberman. He has developed a new method of making small complex ceramic items for use in electronic and chemical industries. These items have been made until now from iron, yet ceramics are more resistant to heat, corrosion, and abrasion.

The raw material for this invention is aluminium which is imported from abroad, but the added value of the product is high.

Both inventions have been patented in Israel and abroad.

The investors who work on using the first invention have already established a new company to make use of the second. Their representative is now in Germany, ordering equipment for the new enterprise.

MILITARY INDUSTRY DISPLAYS NEW WEAPONS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 May 81 p 3

[Article by Tzvi Harel: "Three Military Industry 'Hits'--Mini-Uzi, MAG, Arrow Shell"]

[Text] IDF tank crews will soon receive a new type of personal weapon: Mini-Uzi sub-machinegun, recently developed by the weapons' developing enterprises (MPLN) of the Military Industry. The miniature version of the Uzi was displayed yesterday in public for the first time along with three other new weapons, at the Industry's exhibition in Tel Aviv, attended by 12,000 people.

The push for developing the mini-Uzi came because of IDF tank crew rescue problems, exacerbated by heavy weapons. Despite its reduced size, the new Uzi's characteristics are not compromised. On the contrary: its rate of fire is 1200 rounds per minute as compared to 850 in a regular Uzi.

The length of the mini-Uzi with its butt folded is 35 centimeters. A regular Uzi is 44 centimeters long. Total length of mini-Uzi with butt is 60 centimeters, or 6 centimeters less than the regular model.

It was made known that the demand for this new weapon went up when it was recently seen in pictures showing it used by President Reagan's body guards. Potential buyers are police departments around the world.

The mini-Uzi is equipped with a "deviation compensator" installed at the opening of the barrel. Its purpose is to push the barrel down, since it was found out that a short barrel tends to go up when fired.

Israeli MAG


Another weapon which was displayed at the exhibition, the second ever put on by the Military Industry, is a MAG medium machinegun. The Israeli MAG, developed by the Military Industry, is a copy of the Belgian MAG which has been used by the IDF for years. It can be carried by hand and can be mounted on a tripod in a vehicle.



Galil Sniper's Rifle



Mini-Uzi sub-machinegun



"Arrow" Shell

The MAG, known for its reliability, is used by the armed forces of the United States. "The MAG production," Mr Tzvi Yarom, director of the MPLN said yesterday, "has enabled us to contend with highly reliable technologies."

"Arrow" Shell Shown to the Public

A new exhibit shown to thousands of visitors was the "Arrow" shell, which was shown for the first time to military correspondents a week ago. The shell intended for tank guns (105 millimeter) is stabilized by fins.

Since it was first produced in 1977, the shell has been purchased from the Military Industry for over half a billion pounds. Among the buyers were NATO countries which bought 300,000 rounds. The shell does not spin in flight but is stabilized by its fins. It can penetrate steel.

Galil Sniper's Rifle

The fourth new exhibit is a sniper's rifle made by the Military Industry's "Blue and White" division. It is a new model of the Galil rifle.

In addition to the above, additional weapons which were made by the Military Industry when it was run by the Haganah were shown. One such weapon, a 52 millimeter mortar, is still manufactured by the Industry.

MPLN enterprises employ thousands of people (the Military Industry employs a total of 15,000 people). MPLN Director Tzvi Yarom maintains that the plant at Kiriath Shmoneh which employs hundreds of workers, is one of the most important. Most of our employees in Kiriath Shmoneh, Yarom says with satisfaction, are under 30. They provide an important economic base for both the Military Industry and Kiriath Shmoneh.

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CSO: 4323/17

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

NEW SNIPER TELESCOPE--A new sniper aiming telescope named Nimrod was recently developed in Israel. It will be attached to the new Galil sniper's rifle which was displayed in public for the first time during Independence Day. This was reported by IDF weekly BAMAHANEH this week. The Nimrod telescope is the "last word" in telescopic sights for military use. Its durability and low price have caused interest in many countries, which would like to buy it for military or police use. The instrument was developed by Alex Eliraz of Kur in cooperation with the Military Industry. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 May 81 p 6] 9565

CSO: 4323/17

JUMAYYIL'S CONTACTS WITH FOLLOWUP COMMITTEE DETAILED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 60, 20 Jun 81 pp 26-27

Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Lebanon: AL-MUSTAQBAL Carries Details of Dialogue Between Followup Committee and Bashir al-Jumayyil; Phalangist Official: 'Statement of Severance of Relationship With Israel Is With Sarkis and Will Be Broadcast by Palace as Soon as Agreement on Arab Guarantees Is Reached'"

Excerpt7 Beirut--Informed Phalangist sources have revealed that Envoy Philip Habib reviewed in detail with Bashir al-Jumayyil the dialogue he had with the Arab Followup Committee throughout two meetings: The first at the level of ministers of foreign affairs and the second at the level of ambassadors. After the meeting, the U.S. envoy emerged with several impressions, including the impression that even though the committee has not reached full understanding with the Christian side represented by the Phalanges, it has been able to establish basic principles in accordance with which to work in order to reach an understanding. The Followup Committee members have left Beirut but the door to their return is open, with big hope of achieving positive results. It has also been said that Habib has started efforts in Beirut to create a positive atmosphere for the second stage of the Arab Followup Committee's work so as to contribute to bringing success to its mission. He has worked in this regard with the Maronite leaderships, particularly with Bashir al-Jumayyil, the commander of the Lebanese Forces, who has seemed to be the man with the final say on anything projected by the Arab Followup Committee.

Official sources say that Bashir al-Jumayyil's position is what has delayed announcement by the Arab Followup Committee of a number of security measures and political steps to put the Lebanese crisis on the path to a sound solution after approval of a permanent cease-fire, and what has made the committee content itself with the statement which it has issued and which is confined to underlining the commitment of the various parties to the cease-fire.

One of the official reports on the meetings and contacts of the Arab Followup Committee in Bayt al-Din and Beirut notes that the issue of the relationship with Israel was the basis of every discussion with the Lebanese Front leaderships, especially with Bashir al-Jumayyil.

The Arab Committee has notified the Phalangist leadership that the relationship with Israel is rejected by the Arabs and that continuing this relationship means the creation of an Arab position against the front dealing with Israel and putting this front in the enemy camp.

The Saudi and Kuwaiti ministers of foreign affairs have stressed to Bashir al-Jumayyil the need to adopt positions that put an end to any existing relationship with Israel and that restore cooperation with the Arab countries because this is the only way to bring Lebanon out of its tribulation, to find solutions for its problem and to restore it to normalcy. Ministers Sa'ad al-Faysal and Sabah al-Ahmad have asked the Lebanese Forces commander to issue a statement ending any involvement or relationship with Israel and underlining abidance by the Arab solution and the adoption of Arab initiatives confirming the credibility of this position.

In principle, Bashir al-Jumayyil has agreed to respond after stressing that the Arab countries, or at least some of them, shoulder the responsibility for the relationship with Israel because the right to self-defense is legitimate and dictates cooperating with anybody when necessary. He has also assured the Saudi and Kuwaiti ministers that the Phalange Party and its allies are fully ready to sever the relationship not only with Israel but with any other side with whom the Arab countries ban dealings. He has also made known the party's readiness to declare this position and to abide by it in return for having the Arab countries shoulder their responsibility toward Lebanon and its Christians and for having these countries give the Christians the guarantees that reassure them about their future.

This position has been considered a good basis for drawing up a work plan that begins with the announcement of a cease-fire to be followed by the implementation of measures that abolish the armed manifestations and put an end to the propaganda campaigns. A political dialogue is then to follow in order to solve the disagreement over the Lebanese army's role and then to embark on a search for a detente formula.

When the ambassadors committee conveyed to Bashir al-Jumayyil at B'abda Palace these results which were reached by the Arab Followup Committee, this committee asked him for the statement he had promised to issue on ending the relationship with Israel.

Bashir al-Jumayyil's reply was: "We have put the statement you are asking us for at the disposal of the president of the republic and he now has it. But before this, we want the Arab guarantees that must be given to us. We want these guarantees to come through the legitimate authority and to be presented to it."

An argument then took place over the role of the legitimate authority and of the guarantees. The Arab Committee asserted that there is no such thing as guarantees because "to us, the guarantee lies in an understanding over a comprehensive projection and an executive plan to solve the Lebanese crisis. This projection is to be approved and agreed upon with the legitimate authority and not with any other faction."

Bashir al-Jumayyil replied: "We also want everything to be done through the legitimate authority. When the Arab Followup Committee presents to us the solution plan, we will discuss it. If we find it acceptable, you can then ask for the statement ending the relationship with Israel from the president of the republic."

Upon returning to Bayt al-Din Palace and reviewing the outcome of this meeting with Bashir al-Jumayyil, President Ilyas Sarkis said that he has the statement but that its announcement is tied to the guarantees about which the Phalange talk.

Consequently, the committee delayed the adoption of any measures and contented itself with the statement it had issued. Agreement was then reached to hold a meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs in Riyadh on the 23rd of this month to discuss the work plan and the executive program to solve the Lebanese crisis, to determine the committee's projections in this regard and to hold another meeting at Bayt al-Din Palace on 4 July 1981 and declare this plan after its approval by the main parties.

Last week, there were active contacts along several Lebanese-Syrian axes and Saudi-Syrian-Lebanese axes, in addition to the series of contacts which President Sarkis and Prime Minister al-Wazzan held with the various Lebanese sides and which led to formulating a final draft of a Lebanese working paper to be presented to the Riyadh meeting.

But Slowly

The calm that has prevailed on the frontlines in the Lebanese capital as a result of the various parties' abidance by the cease-fire has been a positive indicator which has strengthened the hope in the possibility that the Arab Followup Committee will reach positive results and solutions in the second phase of its mission. But the situation in Lebanon and the area generally does not call for excessive optimism because the path to establishing solutions that secure the required stability is still mined, especially since the outcome of the Israeli elections will inevitably have a role in full success or failure or partial success or failure.

It must be pointed out here that 4 July has been set as the date for the return of the Arab Followup Committee to meet here in Lebanon so that the Israeli elections may be over and the results announced. Many fear a win by Menachem Begin's bloc in these elections because Begin's return to power will undoubtedly make the Arab Committee's task more difficult.

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CSO: 4304/44

REPORT ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, WESTERN SAHARA REFERENDUM

Immediate Action Urged

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 29, 25 Jul p 1

[Editorial]

[Text]



IF HE is serious, King Hassan's proposal for a 'controlled referendum' to solve the Western Sahara conflict must be acted upon immediately, both by the African states who have agreed to arbitrate in the dispute and by the Polisario Front guerrillas who for years have been fighting for the former Spanish colony.

We will know that King Hassan is serious when he agrees to enter into direct negotiations with the Polisario. As a staunch defender of the Palestinian struggle against Israel, King Hassan must find an uncomfortable parallel between the PLO's quest for international legitimacy and that of the Polisario, whose state-in-exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, has been recognised by over half the Organisation for African Unity's members, despite Morocco's loud protests.

A referendum, overseen by 'impartial' African countries and the United Nations, would probably show that most Western Saharans prefer independence to their present status as a Moroccan province. But this would not be the blow for King Hassan that it seems. First, Morocco has no need for Western Sahara phosphates; it already owns 50bn tonnes, three quarters of the world's known reserves.

Second, Spain left little to the Saharans following its hasty departure from the colony; a Polisario republic could only survive by keeping close economic ties with Morocco and neighbouring Algeria, which along with Libya, has backed the guerrillas, against the king. And with a ceasefire struck, Morocco and Algeria could once again restore mutual trade links.

But as King Hassan well knows, life is not quite that simple. A withdrawal now might be turned against him; he has enemies in the army and opposition, and their numbers have grown after his handling of the food riots in Casablanca. Hassan is a skilled statesman, however, and could weather such attacks.

A long-standing popular joke in the kingdom aptly illustrates this: Hassan is sitting at a cabinet meeting in Rabat with the country's top politicians, generals and technocrats when suddenly in bursts the king's most faithful servant, Colonel Dlimi. 'Sire,' whispers Dlimi in his ear, 'bad news from Skhirat. Robbers and thieves are looting your palace there.' The king quickly surveys his assembled cabinet, then replies: 'Impossible, Dlimi, all the robbers and thieves of the kingdom are here in this room with me.'

'Controlled Referendum'

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 10-17

[Article by Stephen Hughes and Tim McGirk]

[Text] King Hassan's unexpected proposal of a 'controlled referendum' on the Western Sahara issue, which astounded delegates at the OAU summit in Nairobi, was made after a series of behind-the-scenes Moroccan diplomatic initiatives, notably with Libya. The suggestion was surprising, partly because the Moroccan army seems to be containing the Polisario rather well at present, and partly because Moroccan national unity could be weakened by the disappearance of a common enemy. Financial imperatives may hold the answer — the war, now in its sixth year, has been costly, and Morocco's income has been hit by the decline in the phosphate market. Removal of food subsidies in May led to serious rioting in several towns, causing the government to about-turn swiftly. On pages 10-17, Stephen Hughes and Tim McGirk analyse the economic and political state of the nation.

There are prospects of peace in the Western Sahara conflict for the first time in over five years, but a great deal of wrangling lies ahead before any form of political settlement can be achieved.

King Hassan's surprise proposal of a 'controlled referendum,' a suggestion adopted by the OAU summit in Nairobi, appears to be the only way out of a political and military deadlock. But there is no guarantee that it would defuse the conflict completely. Nevertheless, the OAU has set up an 'implementation committee' to carry out a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and the organisation of a referendum for the 'general and regular self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara.'

Composed of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania, the committee has full powers to settle the details 'in collaboration with the parties to the conflict,' and is due to meet before the end of August.

The main problems it faces are the presence of Moroccan administration and some 30,000 troops in the Western Sahara, deciding who and how many people will be eligible to vote, and what role if any will be played by the Polisario Front,' whose guerrillas have been fighting for independence in the disputed territory.

King Hassan's view, expressed unequivocally at a news conference in Rabat after the Nairobi meeting, is that on no account will his army or administration be withdrawn. To support this attitude he cited the cases of Algeria, Djibouti and Zimbabwe, where troops stayed put during similar consultations. Hassan also said that only people registered in the 1974 Spanish census, irrespective of their present whereabouts, can vote in the referendum. The Spanish census counted 73,497 Saharans, which means that the area's present population is probably around 100,000.

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The monarch added that there could be no 'secessionist campaign', meaning he would not tolerate any 'foreigners' calling for independence in the region. He thereby practically eliminated any potential choice for voters.

The Polisario's view — shared by its main backer, Algeria — is that the king's conception of the referendum is merely as a plebiscite to rubber-stamp the accomplished fact of the Moroccan takeover. In communiques and comments in the official press, the Polisario and Algeria have made it clear that there will be no ceasefire unless Morocco accepts direct negotiations with the Polisario, a suggestion flatly refused so far by Hassan.

The Polisario's 'indispensable conditions' for a self-determination referendum are the withdrawal of the Moroccan army and administration, the return of all Saharan refugees, and the installation of a provisional international administration which includes representatives of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

The Moroccan and Polisario positions are therefore irreconcilable and the outcome depends on what the seven-nation implementation committee decides, with the assistance of the UN and the OAU, in consultation with the belligerents.

Of the committee members, Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania are considered pro-Polisario, since they are among the 26 African states to have officially recognised the SADR, while the Sudan, Guinea and Kenya tend to favour Morocco. This leaves Nigeria as a 'neutral' with the determining vote.

A bitter polemic is bound to rage over the question of the number of estimated eligible voters. In the meantime, although the Polisario says it will continue to wage its guerrilla war, its ability to do so has been considerably limited by a number of significant new factors.

To begin with, the Moroccan army has mastery of the terrain, or at least of what is called the 'useful Sahara' — the main towns and mines — around which an extensive defence network running to about 450km has been built.

Western military experts who have seen them say the defences are very effective, and it would take the firepower of a Panzer tank division to smash through them. They are composed of 'berms', or three-metre-high ridges, barbed-wire entanglements, minefields and electronic sensors that can detect the slightest movement. At intervals they are backed up by fixed positions housing small garrisons and, at wider intervals, by mobile intervention forces and aircraft within a few minutes' striking distance.

The success of these defences is indicated by the fact that there have been no big Polisario attacks for months; when the guerrillas tried to prove they were still a force to be reckoned with after Nairobi, the best they could manage was the shelling of two Moroccan positions from a distance of 20km.

Another constraint for the Polisario is the sudden reconciliation between Morocco and Mauritania, brought about at the behest of King Khaled of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis supply both countries with substantial financial aid and were in a position to force the Mauritanian president, Colonel Mohammed Khouna Ould Haydalla, to make peace with King Hassan in the interests of Arab unity.

Although President Haydalla is an ardent Polisario supporter, he was obliged to sign an accord agreeing to ban the use of his territory for attacks on Morocco by the Polisario, whose last major offensive last March on Guelta Zemmour was launched from the Mauritanian side of the frontier. The loss of Mauritanian sanctuary means the Polisario is in theory confined to Algerian territory for its rear bases; this area is opposite the apparently-impenetrable new Moroccan defences.

A third factor is Libya's offer to restore normal relations with Morocco, again in the interests of Arab unity. This implies that Colonel Qaddafi is prepared radically to change his attitude to the Polisario. King Hassan said recently that he has yet to obtain any formal undertaking from Libya that it will modify its support for the Polisario. Relations between the two countries have not been restored.

The prospect of peace in the western Sahara is already having an effect in Morocco. The King managed to forge national unity over the issue in the past, but

with a settlement in sight there are signs that this unity is breaking up.

The Casablanca riots, in which between 66 (the official figure) and 637 (the opposition figure), are said to have died, were the result of widespread discontent over higher prices for basic foods introduced by the government at a time when the country is suffering from one of the worst droughts in decades.

The violence was touched off by clashes between rival trade unions, when the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) refused to join a nationwide general strike called by the Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT), which is allied to the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), the main opposition party. The UMT drivers wanted to keep the city buses running, so CDT militants smashed or set fire to fifty of them, sparking a wave of violence such as Casablanca had not seen in 16 years.

In the aftermath of the riots, 2,000 are to stand trial, the opposition press is suspended indefinitely, and what is called by the opposition 'the most brutal repression' on the part of the authorities strengthened the USFP in its determination to pull its 16 representatives out of parliament.

This would leave the king with a rubber-stamp assembly and the opposition free to agitate for economic and social reforms just when an end to the Sahara war is likely to encourage dissent at home.

For the moment, King Hassan is keeping his counsel. He expressed no anger about the violence, just regretted that it had coincided with a crucial moment for Morocco at Nairobi. He even said Casablanca had a 'good record' in the past, adding that justice would take its course, and implied that he could later exercise royal clemency and thereby patch up his relations with the opposition.

DEVASTATED by a terrible drought, many farmers in Morocco abandoned their parched acres on the edge of the desert and headed for the dirty, tin-shack shantytowns surrounding Casablanca. Bread was cheap, but the new arrivals found little else: there were no jobs, and few schools and hospitals. Only violent crime seemed plentiful.

Then they could no longer afford the bread: following strict budgetary advice from International Monetary Fund experts, the impoverished Moroccan government last May slashed subsidies on flour, sugar, oil and other commodities. Soon afterwards, on 20 June, rioting spread through Casablanca's slums like an uncontrollable brushfire. When armed security forces finally quelled the disturbances, at least 66 people (the government figure) had been killed, hundreds injured and 2,000 demonstrators, mainly trade unionists and members of the opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), jailed. Opposition sources claim the death toll was much higher, and eyewitnesses say that as a way of hiding the high casualty rate, the police made house-to-house searches for corpses and quietly dragged them off to the city morgue.

After the riots, which also broke out in the capital, Rabat, Fez and Marrakesh, King Hassan wasted no time in restoring at least partial commodity subsidies. But the damage was done. In the aftermath of the disturbances, many bankers wondered if the IMF demands — both on Morocco and other struggling low-income countries — had been unreasonable to begin with. After all, they said, the point of the IMF is to prop up governments, especially those of pro-American allies like King Hassan, not hasten their downfall.

As one US banker in London remarked: 'Morocco has one of the biggest financial imbalances in the Middle East. In these cases any readjustment over a short period of time is extremely painful. There's always a danger that the government gets hurt.' This banker added that the IMF policy, in fact, is more lenient to relative paupers like Morocco today than it was in the early 1970s, when the lending institution demanded 'impossible' results within 12 months.

At stake is a \$1bn credit for Morocco, arranged by the IMF last October. The money comes in instalments over the next three years, and if the IMF thinks Morocco isn't tightening its belt fast enough it can — and may — cancel the credit facility. When asked if the demands on Morocco might have been too harsh, an IMF official in Washington retorted: 'If a country's in a mess, a remedy has to be found whether there's an IMF or not. We don't impose measures, only suggest them. So it's up to the Moroccan government to decide how the measures are implemented.'

However, in the case of Morocco, the IMF's prescriptions were quite specific: reform taxes, shape up the export industries — phosphates, fisheries and agriculture — and take an axe to government spending, including subsidies on consumer goods. Yet King Hassan could not have picked a worse time for unpopular cutbacks. The Western Sahara war between the king's armies and the Polisario Front Saharan tribesmen has dragged into its sixth year, and only through massive loans from Saudi Arabia can Morocco cover its war costs. Even so, its ill-equipped navy can do nothing to stop foreign vessels from poaching fish along Morocco's 1,200km coastline. In addition, drought has killed off nearly one third of Morocco's livestock and withered most of this year's grain crop.

To make matters worse, sales of Morocco's main export, phosphate — an essential fertiliser ingredient — have fallen off drastically. *Green Markets*, the authoritative fertiliser periodical based in

Washington, US, claims that the price for Moroccan triplesuperphosphate, a type of phosphoric acid, has tumbled from \$210 a tonne in February 1980 to a present \$145. Phosphate rock, of which Morocco has the world's largest reserves, also fell in price.

Phosphate sellers around the world were hurt by Washington's decision to halt Occidental Petroleum Corporation sales of 700,000 tonnes of enriched phosphate to the Soviet Union. 'When Oxy couldn't sell it to the Russians, they put it on the American market,' observed one fertiliser expert. This dumping occurred at a time when poor crops and high interest rates in the US — by far the largest single market for phosphate — forced the price down further still. 'There are companies in Florida and Louisiana (the main phosphate mining belt in the US) who aren't even recovering their production costs,' said a *Green Markets* analyst.

Another snag for Morocco is the appearance of new competitors in an already-overcrowded market. South Africa, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Mexico and Australia will begin exporting significant quantities of rock and phosphoric acids within the next three years, according to experts. Although still the biggest exporter of phosphate rock in the world, Moroccan sales dwindled by 8.6 per cent last year, while US producers saw their share of the market leap by 27 per cent. Faced with low demand and persistent attacks on their open mine at Bu Graa by Polisario guerrillas, the Moroccans suspended their controversial sales of phosphates from Western Sahara, a territory Morocco annexed from Spain, in a somewhat debatable manoeuvre, in February 1976.

The phosphate market is expected to remain slack through 1981 according to industry analysts, so Morocco cannot count on a sudden boost in sales to replenish its empty treasuries. As it stands, all of Morocco's phosphate revenues go to cover oil imports, with no cash left over for improving other key economic sectors that might provide more jobs. Recent findings by the World Bank — which Morocco angrily disputes — report that nearly one third of the country's 20m population fall below the bank's absolute poverty line.

However, King Hassan has friends in high places. American banking sources in London doubted that the IMF would withhold the remaining instalments of the credit should King Hassan decide that to comply with the IMF measures would lead to more rioting. 'The biggest noise in the IMF is still the US,' said one banker. 'You can expect the Americans and the Saudis to back any Moroccan demand for financial aid.'

Still, even with emergency cash infusions from its powerful allies, the problems that led to the Casablanca riots will remain. Although Premier Maati Bouabid's government swiftly rescinded its decision to cut food subsidies by 40 per cent, there is still an average 20 per cent increase on sugar, oil, milk, butter and flour. It is estimated that Moroccans spend most of their earnings on these five staples.

Like most agricultural people, bread for the Moroccans holds a religious--and highly political--significance. Every household, even in the tin shantytowns of Casablanca, makes its own 'hobbes' a flat, platter-shaped loaf that is often decorated with a small crescent or star so that a family can tell their bread apart from other loaves at the public ovens. The three basic ingredients for bread--flour, water and salt--are represented one every mosque in the kingdom by three metal spheres mounted on top of each minaret. For most Moroccans bread is an alienable right. And unless Hassan can guarantee them bread, and cheap bread at that, his kingdom is in trouble.

KING HASSAN of Morocco, had he not inherited a poor but durable monarchy from his father, Mohammed V, would have made a great escape artist. By his own account, the 52-year-old king has survived 16 assassination attempts and held onto his throne while wars, military coups and rebellions raged in the desert states around him. It came as no surprise, then, that Hassan slipped nimbly away from the box of swords that awaited him at the Organisation of African Unity summit in Nairobi.

Backed into a corner over his Western Sahara policy -- over half the OAU states recognise the claims of the tribesmen fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara -- King Hassan stunned the Nairobi summit. He made the unexpected, and seemingly conciliatory, announcement that Morocco would agree to a 'controlled referendum' as a means of ending the costly six-year war.

The first stage would be a ceasefire with the Polisario Front guerrillas. Armed by Algeria and Libya, the guerrillas use a base in Tindouf, Algeria, from which to launch their hit-and-run raids on Moroccan outposts in the Western Sahara. Step number two calls for a referendum -- supervised by OAU and UN observers -- of all true 'Saharans' both inside the Moroccan-occupied territory and in the Tindouf refugee camps.

Political observers are divided as to the intentions behind Hassan's sleight of hand in Nairobi. Some say he is only stalling for time, that given the riots in Casablanca, the military and the opposition parties would seize on the pretext of an unpopular Saharan withdrawal to oust him. Other observers claim Hassan realises that a settlement to the war, and renewed economic ties with Algeria, would give the Rabat government a chance to repair Morocco's social and economic damage.

The king himself has been predictably vague. Western diplomats in Washington and Europe following the desert conflict say that Hassan will stop short of direct negotiations with the Polisario Front -- one of the guerrillas' conditions for a ceasefire. The king constantly refers to the Polisario and their Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as 'a gang of mercenaries.' And at Nairobi, Moroccan delegates brawled with the Saharans.

However, Hassan found himself a surprise ally in Libya's Colonel Moammar Qaddafi. Once bitter enemies, Qaddafi and Hassan found it politic to mend their old quarrels. Libya wanted to rally all Arab countries against Israel's air raid on the Baghdad nuclear reactor.

On the African side, Qaddafi wanted at the very least to fend off OAU criticism of Libyan intervention in Chad. At the most he wanted African leaders gathered in Nairobi to agree that the next OAU summit be held in Tripoli. Qaddafi achieved both goals, and his jubilant secretary for external affairs, Ali Abdel Salem Tariki, called a press conference in Nairobi where he boasted that Libya had been 'the star of the show'.

Morocco certainly provided backstage assistance: had he wished. King Hassan could have mustered enough African allies to give the Libyan delegates an angry reception. However, several weeks before the OAU summit, Hassan had dispatched a squadron of diplomats to 90 countries, in a bid to explain Libya's actions in North Africa.

Shortly before the summit, Qaddafi asked Palestinian Chief Yasser Arafat, one of the few Arab leaders able to travel between Tripoli and Rabat with impunity, to intercede with Hassan. Reliable diplomatic sources in London told *8 Days* that Hassan had agreed to keep quiet at the OAU summit about Libyan troops in Chad in exchange for a withdrawal of Qaddafi's support for the Polisario. Reports of this arrangement, however, were brushed aside by King Hassan at a press conference in Rabat and also by the Polisario Front representative in London, who said that Libya was still supporting the guerrillas.

Hassan's other unfinished business at the African summit was with Mauritania. When President Mohammed Ould Haydalla accused Hassan of plotting to overthrow him in an attempted military coup earlier this year, the Moroccan king stormed out of the Nairobi conference hall. Morocco's diplomatic ties with Mauritania frayed soon after the desperately poor Nouakchott government walked out of the Western Sahara agreement, effectively abandoning its share of the former Spanish colony to the Polisario guerrillas. It was left to the Saudis, who provide both countries with sizeable financial assistance, to insist that Morocco and Mauritania end their bickering.

CSO: 4500/27

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION OF CASABLANCA--On 22 July, Prime Minister Maati Bouabid announced the decision to divide Casablanca into five prefectures. They are Casablanca-Anfa, 1,600,000 inhabitants; Hay Mohamedi-Ain Sebaa, 600,000 inhabitants; Ain Chock-Hay Hassani, 500,000 inhabitants; Ben Msik-Sidi Othmane, 800,000 inhabitants; and Mohamedia, formerly called Fedalah, 250,000 inhabitants. [Excerpts] [Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Jul 81 p 3]

APPOINTMENT OF PREFECTS--On 28 July 1981, His Majesty the King appointed the following prefects for the five newly created prefectures: Ahmad al-Fizazi, Casablanca-Anfa; Ahmad Shawqi, al-Mohamadi-Ain al-Sebaa; Mustafa al-'Alami, Ben Msik-Sidi Othmane; Larbi Ouezzani, Hay al-Hassani-Ain al-Chok; and 'Abdallah Ouezzani, al-Mohamadia-Zenata. [Excerpt] [Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 30 Jul 81 pp 1, 5]

CSO: 4504/50

POTENTIAL OF NEW ANTIGOVERNMENT ALLIANCE REVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 22-28 Jun, 29 Jun-5 Jul 81

/Article by Muhammad al-Hasan Khalil: "Studies on the Progressive National and Domestic Alliance"/

/22-28 Jun 81 pp 35-37/

/Text/ The phenomenon of alliances among political forces which are agreed on the goals they are trying to achieve is not a new one, and it did not begin with the emergence of parties and political movements in the modern era. However, points of congruence of concurrence between different approaches can be strategic, tactical or both together. What distinguishes one alliance from another? The model to which the writer is referring in this study is that of the alliance between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (Sudanese region).

Strategic alliances are combative forms of action which become crystallized through the powers of persons with specific expertise in struggling in the context of a common notion in order to provide the forms of political, movemental and organizational interaction which are best able to achieve a long-range goal.

All political alliances are broad consensuses regarding numerous points through which the organization of various aspects of common political experience is attained and the alliances are transformed into a guide to action dealing with issues on which a unified vision is formed.

Alliances, on this level, evolve from a common vision to a common formula. While every alliance is the result of a political consensus, every alliance contains specific combative duties; that is, it requires that missions be performed, some of which are direct and concern every party to the alliance individually, some of which are common. Thus alliances are a vision on the one hand and an activity on the other.

Political alliances do not exist in a vacuum, because they are the product of sufferings and needs which respond to the goals of those in the alliance, be these goals tentative or not. Alliances take place among parties, and each party to an alliance has his specific vision in the context of his special objectives; alliances embody the most advanced form of consensus, and in themselves are a summary of positions expressive of common elements in combative relations and political

visions, as proof of a rapprochement which has a background and dimensions that elevate it above the level of random activities of the moment.

/Two lines missing/ the necessity to create an integrated platform for what is actually being established, such as higher tentative goals for the alliance lying within a conception of the parties connected to it. Thus every alliance has a specific context that brings the forces in the alliance together, but they do not merge totally. Alliances are a process of filling the gap in political rapprochement and creating common ground for establishing goals and slogans which will deal with issues in a stage of struggle.

/Two lines missing/ forms of political action observing the aspects of differences and concurrence in positions.

Every process of consensus must have a purpose in order to attain some objective. Here it is worth distinguishing between tactical and strategic alliances.

Tactical alliances are marked by the particular nature of common goals, in isolation from estimates of political gains that may concern them; therefore they have a higher character of /two lines missing/, in fact do not commit themselves to provide them or to provide the means to lead to them.

Strategic alliances, to the contrary, are distinguished by embodying the general interest of the people, with a clear line defining commitments, providing a view of a historic reality covering an entire stage.

Alliances concentrate on these objectives, on the one hand. They also create the formulas which will make it possible to attain these goals and in their circumstances they are conditioned by means which offer the greatest potential, through organized joint effort. On this basis, it is necessary that every alliance be based on an integrated conception of each party's role and at the same time on each party's position. Through this preliminary glance, we can state that alliances are the totality of specific circumstances that is imparted to joint political action. Every joint activity in a political alliance is founded on an objective vision of the nature of the political and social struggle and battle which is endorsed by the principle of organizational independence; that is, the parties to every alliance preserve organizational independence and this constitutes the objective based that provides the potential for combative struggle and places that at the service of the goals which produces the alliance. Here is where we find the practical importance of interaction among forces and formulations in the alliance, to enable the alliance to evolve from its lower forms and patterns to higher forms, in accordance with the higher demands which the alliance has taken part in creating.

Alliances express an advanced state, and the pursuit of alliances develops until /two lines missing/ the conditions of the alliances. Thus every alliance is founded on the endorsement of a political entity composed of various parties. In another area, these different parties have specific positions and visions which they believe are the higher goals for which they are fighting; consequently, the alliance is based on a reality which justifies its existence as the joint action of independent parties.

Thus every alliance arises from the given facts of the actual situation in the popular arena, and this popular arena, and the way it is viewed in the light of the existence of the political forces, either partially or totally expresses specific mass aspirations.

What justifies any alliance is the existence of numerous forces which have their various roles, histories and circumstances of growth in terms of their premises and their orientations. The mere existence of an alliance means the absence of a political force which is equal or by nature possesses an equivalence to the arena of mass struggle and combat. Political alliance means adhering to a notion contrary to that of the monopolization of political action.

Thus we find that alliances are a product of the objective circumstances and actual demands and problems that face the process of mass struggle, unititing numerous parties while at the same time providing them with the wherewithal for launching unified joint action. Every alliance is engendered by needs, and the premises of every alliance become the equivalent of a general forward thrust which turns the alliance into something which is possible and which actually exists. Specific circumstances, sometimes temporary, occur and become the equivalent of political motives for the establishment of an alliance, but political motives for the establishing an alliance are not enough to establish an alliance.

Political alliances are founded on principles and bases, foremost of which must be the positive nature of the esteem each party has among the others, each party's political and historic course, and efforts exerted to unify the mass struggle, in addition to the strategic and theoretical aspect of the establishment of the alliance or the maximum objectives of the alliance. At this point we can concentrate on the subject of the alliance between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Democratic Unionist Party.

The alliance between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party was not established or born in a haphazard manner; rather, it emerged as the result of objective causes which made this alliance a necessity and an urgent act in order to establish optimum conditions for combative relations between the two parties. It is not the offspring of political happenstance, for instance the political quest of general popular demands for the unity of nationalist forces, nor it is an elitist consensus isolated from the progressive nationalist struggle. Rather it is, in essence, a defense of broad mass goals, and it casts the most concentrated light on issues on the domestic stage as well as the causes of the Arab nation.

It did not constitute a transitory conviction abstracted from its combative context from the beginning. It is the causes which produced this alliance that make us reach this conviction. Our national combative legacy causes us to dispense with any concern to arrive at this abstract truth in order to absorb the alliance, create a true front culture and be aware of the conceptions of this alliance, because there are many forms of temporary, haphazard political consensus which to a large degree have distorted the notions of organized political relations among the parties involved in national action. Therefore, if we are to grasp the alliance in an objective manner we must, at the outset, ascertain the initial developments which produced this alliance. The natioanlist arena in the nation of the Sudan witnessed

many struggles, before and after independence, and many shifts which have underlined the need for mass struggle in order to continue the national democratic liberation struggle which the national movement has embodied in its struggle against the old colonialism and for which our masses have struggled since independence.

The Sudan has also always been aspiring toward the future. Saving the country from a state of vacillation and building a road to the future in the face of the national struggle became the only route that would put an end to the state of fragmentation of national action, assuming the importance of creating an alliance which was able to inspire the masses and open the pathways to progress up before them -- the pathways to real loyalty to the national legacy and the rising road to our people's long-range objectives of independence, sovereignty and progress.

Therefore the course of national development shows us how much more important strategic alliances are than tentative temporary ones.

What was the nature of alliances in the past?

In the past, alliances were connected to issues of power and were dependent on the forces which had the greatest power and resources for taking over the leadership of government in the Sudan. It was natural that many flaws should dominate such political relations. Basically they were beset by a state of a lack of vision of the problems of national development; in another area, their interrelations vacillated and were unstable.

Thus it is necessary to differentiate between obsolete tactical alliances which are characterized by the broad political coalition activity aimed at power, and political alliances with a strategic depth which keeps their sole concern from being one of transforming their strength into a mere ladder for rising to positions of power. In the context of the opposition, the former alliances were not organized, and they lacked the inspiration of mass struggle and the organization of such struggle about specific goals. They often took form on bases which were sometimes purely elitist and sometimes lay within sterile frameworks that did not have the strength to endure and did not reach a level of formulation and effectiveness that was worth mentioning. Therefore, these relations were formalistic and did not even cover an organizational dimension which could organize the masses' ranks in a fashion enabling them to take off and confront all circumstances obstructing national development. Perhaps the circumstances of military rule and the alliances which occurred in the context of military rule gave us forewarning of this fact -- of the extent the popular Sudanese stage had reached indirect action at a time when active political forces were absent, indeed were surprised by the popular October revolution. This is one example which provides us guidance on the nature of relations among national action forces in a previous stage.

This issue created many interconnected situations, shuffled the cards and wasted opportunities for making a decisive distinction between fighting forces and reactionary forces, between forces which had stopped functioning and were paralyzing the country's development and the popular vanguard. The country of the Sudan continued to experience many spontaneous objective conditions but the forces of progressive national struggle were not united within the context of suitable mass training and

mass advancement toward the unification of their movement and consequently mass advancement toward confrontation of the challenges facing them. Thus the alliances in the previous stage were elitist in the sense that they did not touch upon the true nature of the people's struggle and movement proceeding from a base of mass struggle; thus these relations were not continuous but were dictated by transitory circumstances which the circumstances themselves invalidated. Therefore we can observe the degree of apathy that characterized these alliances: they were distinguished by maneuvering and all the means of distortion which weakened organized political relationships and kept them from exerting influence on the masses.

Consequently, a hastily-arranged context at the upper levels resulted in consensus, then dissension, among numerous political parties, imparting to them negative features and accumulated burdens, which consequently did not help create a natural atmosphere for rectifying the course of the national experiment. However, does that mean that the problem lay just in the form by which consensus was reached, or did the problem arise from the contradictory nature and internal tensions of this consensus, making the question legitimate and relevant?

Were the alliances created in a truly complete fashion? What are the features of the deficiencies which dominated these political links?

By the start of the era of independence, the parties had embarked on their first experiment following a number of schisms which arose from the links specific forces had with colonialism that placed them at the service of colonialism. Then occurred the process whereby the Sudan got its independence, and the actual situation in the country became subject to an alliance among those in power which produced many complications. It was under these conditions that the National Movement Party embarked upon the experience of governing. The party was divided within itself and this enabled reactionary forces to stalk their prey, lay bare their intentions and turn power into an instrument for imposing their tutelage upon the post-independence Sudan. At that stage, the National Movement Party did not possess a program which spelled out its positions on questions involving the national struggle, as a consequence of the rift within itself and its participation in power; it was experiencing subjective contradictions on the one hand and contradictions with other parties on the other. This enabled the National Party, specifically, to hand power over, as it was unable to push through plans for a shift to neocolonialism in the Sudan in the framework of the first Sudanese parties that held power following independence.

By virtue of the fact that it had come into being as the product of a national struggle of liberation, the National Action Party remained able to respond to an awareness of colonialism's schemes on the popular scene at a time when the National Party, as was always the case with it, was trying to reap the benefit. The rift in the National Unionist Party in this early stage came about within a political and social context which was the expression of new elements that had started to be influenced at an early point in the post-independence stage; the National Party benefited from that, since it shifted from its status as a minority in the first parliament to real leadership of the first government in power in the post-independence stage. This constituted a gain for the National Party, in spite of its obsolete structure which was linked to colonialism and to the exploitation of contradictions on behalf of the quasi-feudalist and bourgeois forces.

Dealing with this issue is not a technical matter of determining the extent of damage inflicted upon the democratic national movement in general; dealing with it, rather, is the product of the results derived from the experiment which ended with the betrayal of liberalism and the institutions of liberalism the movement had been claming to preserve. Thus the process of a shift in power from one characteristic to another was not a gradual one -- rather, it was a process of real transformation which occurred to the benefit of obsolete and reactionary forces and forces opposed to the development of the country. The debacle which befell the liberal experiment proved, in a manner that left no room for doubt, that the Sudan's shift from liberalism to military dictatorship just 2 years after independence was not a chance occurrence but rather was the result of mistakes in the experiment and the composition of the regime, which was contradictory in its own right, having a nationalist pole on the one hand and a subordinate pole on the other -- a joint experiment which could not ultimately succeed. Under military rule, once the forces which had handed power over to the military rule had proved that the new team would never hand power back as it had promised, the National Party in particular hastened to make a review of its own existence without meeting with the other parties; therefore that stage required that the National Party seek recourse in a new maneuver in order to benefit from the conditions of military rule.

However, the National Movement Party did not in turn benefit from these circumstances to unite its rank and weaken National Party influence in the context of the military regime. That was one aspect of the situation. Another was the meeting of the National Unionist Party, the National Party, the Communist Party and others in a manner which was governed by no conditions, in order to exploit the contradiction between the People's Democratic Party and the National Unionist Party in this vortex which the National Party strove to turn to its advantage in order to regain its credit after it had handed power over (a matter which is no secret).

The National Party's attempts were aimed at turning the front of parties within the framework of the regime into a National Party facade and thus this front quickly became a formal one which contented itself with memoranda, everything reverted to the way it was, and the front broke up of its own accord. This sort of wretched end was just the natural result of the preliminaries, which lacked sound features. This induced the Sudanese Communist Party to agree to become a party to the regime's institutions, and it entered the Central Council. In addition, sectors of this party entered the Central Council as a result, and this situation continued until the October revolution and the entry of the Sudan into a new stage.

Following the October revolution, the parties became accustomed to resuming their former relationships and the same rules, which had been retained, governed these relations. The situation following the October revolution bears witness to the establishment of successive governments, agreed to by various means, while the National Party, and the reactionary circles attached to the National Party, were scheming to establish a civilian dictatorship under the cover of the Islamic constitution (in hopes of retaining the balance in the national arena, which had been changed) and were continuing to advance new and modern forces and clear goals which the October revolution had presented and whose slogans it had emphasized. The National Party brandished a serious weapon by dominating the national scene and hinting at the use of arms and the use of traditional powers to

terrorize the Sudanese national movement. However, the National Party was not itself able to remain united, as a result of numerous factors, and broke up internally. This was not, however, a qualitative rift and did not in reality bring about distinctive forces which would represent an advance over the traditional composition of this party. In the light of these circumstances, the National Movement Party reunited itself but it was the basic force for disruption in retaining the balance, in retaining the alliance with the National Party, in spite of its numerous attempts to put the ball into the National Party court and benefit from its contradictions. However, the character of the alliance remained largely intact and the political role of the National Party remained largely intact and the political role of the National Party remained as it was without any changes. Therefore, the domestic state of affairs experienced a deterioration on the political level, corruption on the economic level, and a readiness to suppress the national progressive struggle under the slogan of the suspect Islamic constitution, which was hostile to democratic freedoms, and a forcible transition occurred from which the second liberal experiment could not escape once it had broken apart.

In this stage, the National Party and the Moslem Brothers started to cope with the political situation through the regime for the sake of their own designs. Thus, by the time Democratic Unionist Party regained its unity, conditions had not corrected themselves, because to correct this situation would mean splitting off from the National Party and setting the National Movement Party off in a permanent fashion by alienating it from the positions of the National Party. After the 25 May coup, the political situation changed and the new regime in turn rapidly started to fall apart, take a hostile attitude toward democracy and the popular movement, stir up a thick cloud of slogans, and indeed present itself as an heir to the national struggle and an agent of the masses of our people; it began to set forth a fascistic platform a short time after it took over power.

In this stage, on the one hand the struggle between the forces of national struggle and the authorities became intensified and the opposition started to become organized, on the level of the Democratic Unionist Party and the masses of the al-Ansaw, and in the context of other parties and opposition political forces. Although the national front emerged in these circumstances, we find that new factors were added to the opposition process that actually furnished the National Movement Party with an opposition center after the political leadership which had been guiding the National Party had almost disappeared and consensus was achieved between the Democratic Unionist Party and the masses of the al-Ansar (but excluding the National Party). However, the opportunistic leadership of the National Party came back again and turned the national front into a vessel of which it became a part, in addition to the other remaining struggling forces, so that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi specifically could be a party to the national front and try to exploit the legacy of confrontation which had accumulated between the masses of the al-Ansaw and the reactionary authorities. In this situation, which functioned within the new capabilities and resources to create an effective opposition led by the National Movement Party, an attempt was made to have the National Party recover its position and lead the national front — if not become an actual leader of it. This created a new condition which lay within the spirit of

vacillation and sometimes conflict over the essence of the propositions the national front was raising at that time, and reached the point where we found that the national front's program was self-contradictory and revealed nothing new. This to a large degree reflected the National Party's attempts to fragment the nationalist opposition which had started to organize itself between the Democratic Unionist Party and the masses of the al-Ansar. Thus the National Party and the Moslem Brothers worked to weaken this front, bargain with it and turn it into a formal opposition which contented itself with reaching a political settlement with the regime.

Thus the National Party remained true to its destructive role and pursued it inside the national front, in the company of the Moslem Brothers. The consequences of this development are well known to us, since these parties again adopted the same conspiratorial role they had been playing, detached themselves from the national front, and settled on the reconciliation as their political strategy. Here we find that the basic forces in the national front had rid themselves of these people and had assumed a natural position which would enable them to perform their role effectively and with distinction, following the withdrawal of those marginal forces which had attempted to turn the national front into an instrument for achieving their narrow ends and their craving for power.

/29 Jun-5 July 81 pp 35-37/

[Text] AL-DUSTUR has published the first part of an important study on the progressive domestic national alliance among political forces which have reached consensus on the goals they are trying to realize. In his study, the writer has referred to the example of the alliance between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (Sudanese region), based on agreement on strategic and tactical points.

This is the second and final section of the study.

Why are we reviewing this history?

We are reviewing this history in order to get an overview of the political range and horizon of the alliance between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Democratic Unionist Party.

The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party closely observed the development of the national movement in its diverse phases and made an objective evaluation of this development through an analytical and at the same time a critical view of the situation. All the analyses the party issued many years before the alliance prior to the circumstances in which the alliance arose, held that the relationship between the National Movement Party and the National Party was ultimately harmful to the tasks of national development, and indeed created many difficulties in organizing the movement of national struggle. Thus the state of affairs which we are experiencing in the form of complicated circumstances enables us to have a pure, long-range view of qualitative nonobjective evaluations, indeed causes us to advance on a footing of clarity and an interchange of issues of struggle in the context of proper, concentrated dialogue. This has resulted in making the issues of an alliance between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Democratic Unionist Party a basis for the

discussions which actually took place under the circumstances and in the context in which they took place. This issue was not isolated or remote from the realities and details of the common view that it was necessary to establish an alliance between the two parties.

Our people had been facing numerous challenges, sometimes decisive ones, on subjects which infringed upon national sovereignty and the Sudan's orientation after independence. The National Movement Party, with its people and mass support, committed itself to a nationalist position which it expressed at the outset when it called for a unity of the struggle in Egypt and the Sudan, taking a longer view and also seeking out its positions through its commitment to the sovereignty of the country and its independence, as well as to the elimination of colonialist plots from the area and from the Sudan. After independence, it did not use fascistic methods to weaken the mass struggle. Indeed, it contented itself with struggling in the context of its political experiment and did not betray it, regardless of our view of this liberal political experiment. When it was hoped that the Sudan would join the Baghdad Pact and the suspect colonialist plans in the fifties, the unionists adopted clear positions against these schemes; in fact, when the National Movement Party proceeded to unite itself and bring down the National Party government, power was handed over to the generals in 1958 and thus its positions remained ones of commitment to the national and domestic interest. Likewise the National Movement Party was distinguished by openness and responsiveness toward all national issues.

It managed to evolve its experiment by itself in the context of opposition to the existing regime and it was present in all the positions which reflected the nature of our masses' struggle against this regime and commitment to the causes of the Arab nation.

Thus we look upon the Democratic Unionist Party and evaluate its experiment in accordance with basic indestructible dimensions, and therefore the groundwork of the common struggle has made it obligatory for us to investigate the legacy and positions of the national struggle. Currently the Democratic Unionist Party is taking a firm stand on all the authorities' maneuvers to expand their base under the cover of what is called reconciliation. Therefore the alliance between the two parties is one based on proper foundations of vision on the one hand and is constructed within the context of the circumstances of secret struggle which we are engaged in in the country and in the context of broad popular opposition. Therefore the emergence of the consensus has been a way of specifying long-range strategic missions which will not just open up horizons for the resurgence of the Sudan but will be missions more long-range than these, on the national level. At the same time, emergence of the alliance has rid a basic segment of the arena of national struggle of obstacles to proper interlocking relationships from which only the forces of backwardness and subservience have benefited.

The consensus calls for the adoption of a national line which will preserve the country's independence and prevent subordination to centers of foreign influence as a faithful response to the struggle for independence which began at an earlier stage.

In another area, this alliance is committed to our masses' struggle to rid the Arab nation of Zionism and neocolonialism, beginning with the establishment of an economic system which rejects the capitalist road to development and is based on a form of development which will achieve the missions and duties of the stage to uplift the public sector, turn it into a leading sector, program the domestic economy, develop it with reliance on planning, weaken all the foundations on which the parasitic bourgeoisie in the country has grown, and extirpate the manifestations of political, economic and moral corruption. In another area, the alliance has dealt with direct important issues on the organization of the political arena, starting with the organization of the democratic movement in general in its areas and fields with complete coordination between the two parties and the transfer of the alliance from formal formulas to practical everyday combative formulas through consensus between the bases of the two parties and the acquisition of mutual expertise through the greatest degrees of common action and interaction, so that this alliance may be built on firm foundations. Thus the alliance between the two parties will be a comprehensive one covering the needs of the entire stage in the political and economic context in order to return domestic development to its proper course.

Thus the struggle of the two parties is a comprehensive one which assures a scope that goes beyond all the alliances the local stage has witnessed and deepens the joint notion of transforming the country in a revolutionary manner and a progressive manner toward more distant objectives of liberation and social development. This requires a political struggle so that the aspects of this experiment may be underlined in the bases of the two parties and on the mass level in general. For this reason, in terms of its type and nature, the alliance is of a strategic type, since it deals with the issues in the long range stage of the battle masses to break up the domestic contradiction between the forces of the masses, which are struggling for the sake of progress and all the fraudulent alternatives now existing or working to impose a fait accompli upon our people. Thus the strategic alliance which we are talking about is a necessity, not a political measure or just the arrangement of a process of political change, in spite of the importance of change as a basic link in the process of inaugurating political, economic and social transformations.

There remains an important issue, that of the points of consensus and difference between the two parties. First:

This issue does not concern the alliance directly, because the alliance is founded on agreement, which, naturally, means that the alliance has been agreed upon and that, by the nature of the situation, there is no dispute over it. While there are details which are unclear or need deeper study, review or completion, the staffs concerned will be responsible for creating the wherewithal for realizing suitable formulas regarding these details within the general principles of the alliance and for satisfying these details for the sake of the alliance.

However, if what is meant are the distinguishing features of both parties which constitute the real state, nature and goals of the parties, this, to a large degree will depend on the composition of each party on the one hand and the level of the forces which make them up. In the context of internal bases, there

remains a difference of identity between the parties, when one understands their party structure and rules. Each party possesses its internal identity and matters regulating this identity. This dimension is an organizational one and therefore it is natural for us to note, on the one hand, the structure and national organization of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and, on the other, the structure and organizational scope of the Democratic Unionist Party. In the context of goals, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is a nationwide revolutionary party believing in the unity of the Arab nation and combining the class struggle and the national struggle. It considers that the Arab nation is a single unit socially, politically, culturally and economically, and that therefore the fragmentation existing in the Arab nation is a state which will disappear through revolution, because it is an anomalous state. Therefore this party is fighting in the nationwide context in its organization, proceeding from the close-knit nature of the unity of Arab struggle and the struggle for Arab unity. In the domestic context, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party gives special importance to the domestic struggle and is fighting to strengthen the domestic situation and to link it to the nationwide one.

On this basis, its strategy is founded on two struggles at the same time, the national struggle and the domestic one. The domestic struggle takes note of particular characteristics and diversity in the national experience through the medium of total solidarity, which cannot be separated from a unified struggle for unity, freedom and socialism.

The Democratic Unionist Party arose during one of the decisive stages of the national struggle within a general current which expressed broad popular aspirations through the process of Arab upsurge and the struggle against colonialism. Therefore we do not consider that the locale of the origin is distinct from the nature of the united struggle against colonialism, since the national struggle is a united one. Circumstances of fragmentation and colonialism made it mandatory that the movement of national liberationist resurgence in the Arab world take numerous paths in the struggle against backwardness and colonialism, in the light of the lack of an administration which could pave a single path for this movement when the modern battle of the Arab people against colonialism began.

For this reason, an overall view of the struggle of the Democratic Unionist Party which understands the particular qualities of the national struggle will cause us to view this party within the framework of a period when the national socialist movement had not grown in our country; therefore the emphases which the unionist movement in general made in its slogans were, in their dimensions, congruent with the movement of national struggle. However, the clarity or obscurity of goals is not a final fact; rather, it is a fact subject to numerous elements among them the circumstances of the national struggle in general and the domestic challenges which have arisen from the colonial reality. Thus we find that the notions of struggle are what brings a given party in the Arab nation closer, or distances it, from the issue of domestic struggle. Therefore we find that it is most difficult for us to demand that an experiment such as that be transformed under these exceptional circumstances by setting forth all the national goals in full in their contexts at one stroke. For this reason, as

well, one can grasp why the birth and appearance of the national socialist movement occurred in the Arab east but did not appear in the Maghreb: a group of historic factors led to that. However, in the context of the domestic state of affairs, the National Movement Party, as a broad current joined by numerous social currents to which belonged social groups and classes, some of which were revolutionary, some of which belonged to new classes, and some of which belonged to the traditional situation, is precisely what caused the Democratic Unionist Party to turn into a party with mass origins and a party with a mass nature. Thus the issue of organizational and intellectual identity must not be subject to mere theoretical distinctions; it must be viewed in a true historic fashion lest we pause at length to discuss the components which cause each party to stand in its own right.

The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party's position on the nature of social forces arises from the fact that the forces which have real interests in change are the revolutionary classes -- the classes of workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and soldiers. Thus it is the group of toiling people which is the most revolutionary of classes, since they have been affected by a state of exploitation as a result of the fact that they have been ground down by class oppression and exploitation and on this basis they are ones who will benefit from the process of change, because this change sets forth essentially from the premise of the interests of these classes -- through struggle, however. There are other forces which play a fighting role and become part of the movement of social, economic, political and cultural change, that is, that have an interest in change, that is, in revolution. There are the petty bourgeois groups which when connected to the issue of change assume the character of revolutionary intellectuals and tilt toward the masses, and consequently constitute an inseparable part of the popular alliance fighting against oppression and exploitation.

There remain groups and classes which, through their interests, their mentality and their productive and political status, tend not to be part of these revolutionary forces which are struggling for their interests in accordance with the goals which this struggle expresses. Therefore, quasi-feudalist forces and bourgeois forces are not included in this alliance and are not part of the popular masses in the revolutionary notion which is naturally different from the concept of citizenship. Therefore, even when we talk about the people, we mean that portion of the people which has a real interest in struggle and change. This does not mean that there are no perverse circumstances. Specific groups exist which are not revolutionary in their structure but, at one stage, play a role in the general national struggle against colonialism; however, the fact of their contradiction with the masses starts with the withdrawal of direct colonialism. Consequently, their resurgence is the process of struggle against the masses and they assume this role in the absence of colonialism.

Thus we find that the bourgeoisie in the Arab nation is not in reality the bourgeois class which was once upon a time a revolutionary one. The bourgeoisie in Europe came about as the offspring of a specific historic stage and circumstances, bore slogans of change, and in reality did manage to cover an entire stage and prove that it was a revolutionary class, before it became transformed into a reactionary class later, hostile, through its exploitation, to the workers.

Therefore, the bourgeoisie in Europe played revolutionary roles; we find that this role in the post-feudal stage, in the struggle against the remnants of feudalism, in the struggle for democracy, and in the general upsurge in society, culture and the arts which the bourgeoisie in Europe led.

Thus we reveal the class and the political nature of these groups, which are constantly playing a parasitic role. They do not occupy a basic position in production and do not play any true positive political role on behalf of the masses. However, this does not mean that the stage is of necessity one of eliminating the local bourgeoisies. There is still broad scope for them to play some part in private activity in the context of their material being and their participation, albeit partial, in development. This is because these private sectors will play a limited role in the development process, especially in the areas of services and construction, domestic trade and the production of certain commodities. Thus, transcending their role will in reality not occur until the progressive transformations reach a higher stage by virtue of which society will advance to the stage of radical socialist transformation. However, what is important, as far as we are concerned, is these groups' future presence in the alliance and in political representation. In this context they are to be excluded and are not part of a true mass alliance. They can play their role within a central economic planning which clearly sets out the limits of their role in the development process and their contribution to the private sector in matters which concern the government sector in development and the provision of certain requirements during the transitional stage. According to the foregoing, one must draw a distinction between these classes' economic and political role: economically they will be guided and their fields of activity will be spelled out, while politically society will be liberated from their influence by placing the maximum guarantees that they will not resume playing their political role and by restricting their movement and their tendency toward hostility toward progress.

Therefore, in this stage, there will be no embarrassment over their role, since they will not pose an obstacle to development plans and will participate in certain development activities in a manner planned by the state. However, this role can never be a basic one, since the shift of this role to a basic one would mean the sovereignty of the bourgeoisie and its guidance of development, that is, the shift of the entire economic state of affairs to a subordinate, subservient one which we cannot suppose could be divorced from the capitalist market and capitalist development. Thus, our statement that it is necessary to set forth a progressive, non-capitalist form of development ultimately means turning the public sector into the truly leading one, not just in the context of industry or agriculture but even in the context of trade and all other sectors. Thus the bourgeoisie must retreat, must be guided, and must reach some stage in which state ownership of production will take over and consequently its role in the whole productive and economic process in general will be dispensed with. Only within these conditions will it be possible to seek a national role for the bourgeoisie; outside these conditions, the bourgeoisie cannot be a national force. If we are talking about social groups which belong to the middle class and are active in the field of commerce, the road is open to these classes within these conditions, and consequently the means will be provided for them, on condition that they content themselves with their situation within this economic developmental orientation.

Otherwise, all variables will be threatened because setting forth an economic strategy which is in keeping with the real state of the current world economy can be attained at the outset only through a political liberation which makes the national interest the criterion of every activity in the development process; failing to endorse a platform of independent political and economic independence will expose the country, or any Arab country, to an onslaught by the capitalist market and the tremendous resources of foreign companies and advanced production, and will consequently make the local market on the one hand, as well as the entire economic structure, weak and incapable of protecting industry, any gains in the context of agriculture, or planning in any field of production and development. Thus thwarting the role of the local bourgeoisie begins with the sovereignty of the state and its political liberation and the establishment of a progressive economic development program which will in economic terms distance the national state of affairs from the dangers of the world capitalist market and also dangers that the country may be linked to foreign economic circles. In the context of development under backward circumstances, the beginning lies with the political, with planning by specifying the features of the economic program and with recognition of the status the state, public ownership of production and private ownership have in production. In spite of our insistence on the nature of the mass alliance, and the need for it to be distinguished by this nature by preserving the purity of the identity of the struggle for change, struggle for change means revolution, revolution has its enemies and its intrinsic forces, and therefore, within this evaluation, it is necessary to understand who are the people who have a real interest in revolution and who are the people who will be damaged by revolutionary activity. We must not be imprecise when we talk about this change. There are social classes which have no interests but themselves. Discovering social contradictions, with all their severity, ascertaining the nature of the exploitation process, categorizing society, and distinguishing exploited forces from exploitative ones and independent ones is the true first beginning of the process of change. Society in reality is not a unified whole; rather, it is governed by numerous struggles, contradictions and interests; this is a fact which is independent of our own consciousness, a fact which exists in society, so why should we be terrified of it? These are the facts of life in society. There are people who steal the people's livelihood and live in a state of affluence to the point of indigestion, while others cannot find their daily bread. We must distinguish carefully when we talk about social forces and not deal naively with these formations and social groups. Thus, in the process of struggle, it is necessary that we resolve this issue not according to the amount of damage that will afflict a small part of the people but in terms of the interests which will accrue to the entire people, in the theoretical context, whether on the economic status of the bourgeoisie, through its history and nature, or through its role in the political alliance in general. We must understand the status of the bourgeoisie through its social function and its position in the struggle for change. If there are specific forces organically linked to the political alliance (when we say organically we mean organizationally), this does not mean that political alliance is an expression of these forces; even if political alliance is planned in a manner which will guarantee these forces' position within a greater process, this does not mean that the alliance is an expression of the interests of these forces. Alliance expresses the interests of a broad segment of masses which are organizationally merged on the one hand, albeit in the context of the masses,

and alliance expresses the reality of mass struggle at a certain stage and expresses the interests of the masses at a certain stage. To take a position on that does not lie within a mere scheduled agenda. The nature of your accomplishments, and what you offer the people, are what determine the level of the struggle with classes that have no interest in revolution and consequently they are what reveal and provoke hostility; when you feel that you have been harmed you will not content yourself with settlements; rather, you will start with sabotage, and consequently the suitable procedure is to trim their nails further, and trimming their nails does not just mean restricting their freedoms -- it means striking out at the heart of their interests. This is a matter of life or death as far as serious forces fighting for the same of the masses go.

The accomplishment of these missions, turning the alliance into the throbbing heart of the movement of the masses and strengthening their confidence in it, is the necessary prelude to shifting the alliance to an advanced level, which means establishment of a progressive national domestic front.

Note/ The expression "local bourgeoisie" is more suitable than the expression "national bourgeoisie."

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